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The United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas is America’s only maximum-
security military prison. Despite frequent references to it in American popular culture, little is known 
about Leavenworth’s evolution as an institution. The existing sources on the subject tend to offer a 
factual account of which buildings were built when, and when certain vocational programs began 
operation, but they offer little analysis of the wider factors that influenced the development of the 
institution. This thesis argues that the evolution of Leavenworth into a permanent military institution 
has been driven by certain key events that have forced the intersection of the civilian and military 
spheres. By supplementing the analysis of military sources with that of unexamined civilian sources, 
such as memoirs from within the prison and newspapers, a broader understanding of the civilian 
pressures which helped drive Leavenworth’s evolution is achieved. This thesis also relies on secondary 
literature to explain and analyse the wider context in which the prison existed, particularly the study of 
civil-military relations and its relevance to Leavenworth. Fort Leavenworth did not develop within a 
vacuum of military thought, but rather was influenced by key events that forced an intersection 
between the civilian and military spheres. The result of these changes has been the evolution of a 
military institution that has remained separate from the civilian penal system, while at the same time 







“Man, they fry you if you’re wrong; they send your ass to Leavenworth.”1 In the 2014 film 
American Sniper, Chris Kyle’s spotter delivers this line as Kyle, played by Bradley Cooper, is about to 
shoot an Iraqi child he believes to be carrying a grenade towards a group of United States Marines. The 
audience understands that the word “Leavenworth” means that, should his assessment of the situation 
be incorrect, then he will be punished under United States military law. The word itself has become a 
metonym for military justice, even among the civilian population. This is a common, long-lived trope in 
films about the American military. In the 1992 military legal procedural film, A Few Good Men, for 
example, Tom Cruise’s character, a judge advocate, facetiously states that, if found guilty of murder, his 
defendants will win “a lifetime at exotic Fort Leavenworth!”2 Even as far back as 1977 in the television 
show, M*A*S*H, in the episode ‘Fade in, Fade Out’ Major Winchester asks Colonel Potter what will 
happen should he refuse to follow orders, to which Colonel Potter responds “Then you’ll be making 
gravel in Leavenworth!”3 In each of these instances the word “Leavenworth” is universally understood 
to mean the harshest punishments of American military justice.  
Despite the use of “Leavenworth”4 in popular culture as a metonym for military justice, little is 
known about its development as an institution. The study of the prison’s history has been left to 
members of the military or those sympathetic to it. These sources do a good job of detailing the 
structural development of the prison, but they are too isolated in their analysis in the sense that they do 
not pay any attention to the broader historical context. The result is a linear narrative based on the 
                                                          
1 Jason Hall, American Sniper, Directed by Clint Eastwood, Warner Bros. Pictures, 2014. 
2 Aaron Sorkin, A Few Good Men, Directed by Rob Reiner, Colombia Pictures, 1992. 
3 M*A*S*H. ‘Fade In, Fade Out’ Episode 123, Directed by Hy Averback, Written by Jim Fritzell and Everett 
Greenbaum, CBS, 20 September 1977. 
4 Leavenworth can have multiple meanings. There is a town Leavenworth, a civilian prison at Leavenworth, as well 
as a military base at Fort Leavenworth. From this point on in this thesis “Leavenworth” will refer to the specific 
Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, unless otherwise stated. 
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assumption that the past is an inevitable progression towards more humane principles. In contrast, this 
thesis deviates from such teleological narratives and examines the broader historical context within 
which the Disciplinary Barracks developed as a military institution and analyses the various internal and 
external pressures that acted on it. This thesis argues that the development of Leavenworth did not 
follow the traditional military-humanitarian narrative put forward by the existing sources, but rather 
was altered by events where the civilian and military spheres were forced to intersect. The value of 
abandoning the teleological narrative, and studying why Leavenworth developed into an institution that 
integrates civilian-humanitarian principles while remaining a separate military institution is that it 
creates a greater understanding of how military institutions in the United States develop in general. The 
military may be separate from society, but its values do not exist in a vacuum. The story of military 
justice is one of interrelation with the civilian sphere, rather than isolation from it. From this 
interrelation has emerged the pragmatic adoption of certain civilian methods that are simply more 
functional. 
The factors which resulted in Leavenworth’s evolution are primarily explained as a consequence 
of civil-military relations, and account for why the institution has developed into one which adopts both 
civilian and military ideals, while remaining distinctly separate from the civilian penal system. The theory 
of civil-military relations provides much of the context for the development of the Disciplinary Barracks 
as it explains the various internal and external pressures that determined its development as an 
institution. As such, this thesis relies on the works of eminent scholars in that field such as political 
scientist Samuel P. Huntington and sociologist Morris Janowitz.5 The debate between these two scholars 
speaks to the broader themes of this thesis. Huntington argues that the main cause of tension between 
civilians and the military is that society expects its military institutions to be both functional and at the 
                                                          
5 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory of Politics and Civil Military Relations, 4th Edition, 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1967). 
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same time conform to societal ideals.6 He calls this dichotomy the functional imperative and the societal 
imperative. The primary issue with this dichotomy is that it can interfere with civilian control of the 
military. If the military does not share the values of the society it protects, then the power of violence it 
holds could become dangerous to that society. Huntington defines two distinct methods of achieving 
civilian control of the military to deal with this issue; subjective control and objective control. Subjective 
civilian control requires strict oversight of the military by a specific civilian group, usually a government 
institution. Huntington is critical of this form of control, arguing that it leads to an expansion of the 
executive powers of government.7 Instead he argues for what he calls objective control, in which a 
distinct class of professional officers isolates itself from society and civilian politics, remaining politically 
neutral. He states that “subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making 
them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, 
making them the tool of the state.”8 
Sociologist Morris Janowitz was the first to challenge Huntington’s framework, by arguing that 
the best way to maintain civilian control of the military was to “civilianize” the military. Unlike 
Huntington, Janowitz argues that the values of the military are not isolated from those of society, but 
are rather a refraction of them.9 Janowitz argues that the best way to reduce the tension of civil-military 
relations is to “civilianize” the military, in the sense that military values should be even more closely 
related to those of the society it serves.10 This is known as convergence and has affected American 
military institutions to differing degrees throughout history. It is also more in line with Huntington’s 
                                                          
6 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 2. 
7 Ibid, p. 81. 
8 Ibid, p. 83. 




“subjective control” model. Although he argues for more civilianizing of the military, Janowitz does not 
advocate for the destruction of military values entirely. Janowitz clarifies his position by stating that the  
…narrowing distinction between military and non-military bureaucracies has not resulted in an 
elimination of fundamental differences, and there is no reason to assume that these differences 
will be eliminated in the future. Despite the rational and technological aspects of the military 
establishment, the need for heroic fighters persists. The pervasive requirements of combat set 
limits to civilianizing tendencies.11  
For Janowtiz, the most desirable military is one that is separate from civilian society, but embodies as 
many civilian values as possible. 
The primary issue in relying on convergence theory, or any sociological theory of civilian control 
of the military, for a historical study is that it could potentially create another teleological narrative. 
Janowitz’s contention is that convergence should be the ultimate goal for military institutions, which is 
based on the assumption that civilian values are superior to military ones. On the other hand, 
Huntington argues that objective control should be the ultimate end because civilian values can 
interfere with military functionality. Janowitz himself states that in the social sciences “there is a 
tendency to use each new set of findings as a fixed basis for projecting and extrapolating trends, with 
profoundly distorting consequences.”12 There is also the fact that convergence is always one-sided in the 
sense that it is less of a transfer of values between the civilian and military spheres, and more of an 
imposition of civilian values on the military. Military values are rarely adopted by mainstream American 
society, hence the need for two separate justice systems. This thesis is not arguing that convergence is 
                                                          
11 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 33. 
12 Morris Janowitz, Introduction to Military Conflict: Essays in the Institutional Analysis of War and Peace, (London; 
SAGE Publications, 1975), p. 11. 
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the primary goal of institutional development at Leavenworth, it simply uses Huntington’s and 
Janowitz’s existing framework to understand change in the institution from a historical perspective.  
Convergence at Leavenworth was never predestined, nor can any universal formula for its 
adoption be extrapolated from its history. The story of Leavenworth is about alignment through 
pragmatic adoption of functional civilian methods during periods when the civilian and military spheres 
intersect, mainly during war. There is no overarching teleological purpose to this change, but neither is it 
meaningless. It occurs in response to the situation, hence the importance of analysing the wider 
historical context. For this reason, this thesis uses the phrase “pragmatic alignment” instead of 
“convergence” to describe the phenomenon in which Leavenworth has adopted certain civilian 
practices. 
The story of military justice in America, and particularly that of Leavenworth, demonstrates 
what both Huntington and Janowitz were talking about when they discussed an alignment values. Using 
the framework provided by Huntington and Janowitz, but without assuming their conclusions about 
desired ends, it is possible to analyse how Leavenworth evolved as an institution. There have been three 
significant events in which the intersection of the civilian and military spheres pushed the Disciplinary 
Barracks system towards more pragmatic alignment, resulting in the permanent institution that 
currently exists. Humanitarian reform for its own sake is rare in the military as military thinking tends to 
focus on the functional imperative. There are, however, times when the liberal values of the civilian 
population intersect with military institutions during times of historical pressure. This often results in the 
military adopting more liberal and humane practices, so long as those methods remain functional in a 
military context. Once a military institution, such as Leavenworth, achieves permanence this intersection 
can occur more gradually, instead of requiring events that cause extreme pressure by forcing the civilian 
and military worlds to intersect on a significant scale. The first significant event was the liberal reform 
instigated by Major Thomas Francis Barr. This provided the impetus for the creation of a more humane 
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and effective system of military incarceration, even though lack of civilian interest meant that purely 
military values took over. Those purely military values were tested to the extreme during the First World 
War when millions of civilians entered the armed service, giving the public a reason to pay attention to 
military justice again. The number of civilians who went through the Disciplinary Barracks system was 
the second major event that became the impetus for reform. The result, however, was piecemeal 
reform of military penology and military justice, followed by a return to the status quo. The final 
significant event that led to pragmatic alignment on a more significant scale came in the aftermath of 
Second World War and the passage of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. With the reforms that 
followed, the Disciplinary Barracks achieved permanence as an institution and could benefit from the 
lessons learned from the past. The evolution of Leavenworth that was caused by these events had no 
teleological purpose, the institution simply adapted to each situation in order to remain functional. The 
result is a separate military prison that adopts certain civilian policies in order to remain functional. 
The existing narratives of progress do a good job of accounting for which building was built in 
which year and when certain programmes came into effect, but they do not offer any deeper historical 
analysis of these significant events. This makes the progress narratives a logical starting point for any 
comprehensive study of the Disciplinary Barracks. This thesis relies on the progress narratives, but 
contextualises them by adding analysis of the military justice system in general. These narratives are 
supplemented by analysing sources that have not been considered in conjunction with military 
penology, including civilian accounts of conditions within the prison and newspapers reporting on it. 
Secondary sources also provided the wider historical context to help explain the internal and external 
pressures that guided the development of the institution. Chapter one analyses the historiographical 
trends present in the scholarship on civilian penology in order to demonstrate the shortfalls of 
scholarship on military penology. Civilian penology is divided into three primary schools of thought. 
These can be defined as whiggish narratives of progress, revisionist narratives, and more well-rounded 
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histories that analyse the various contextual factors that influenced the development of prisons. 
Scholarship on military penology is dominated by the whiggish narratives of progress. Chapter two 
analyses the origins of the Disciplinary Barracks as the first significant intersection of the civilian and 
military spheres in the history of military justice in America. Thomas Francis Barr’s move for 
humanitarian reform was the first shift towards a military prison that adopted certain liberal principles, 
but its implementation was frustrated by socio-economic factors that can be explained through the 
framework of civil-military relations. The Disciplinary Barracks may have been founded on the idea of 
convergence, but the isolation that existed between the civilian and military spheres at the time meant 
that the prison developed solely on military grounds. 
The isolation of the military was shattered during the First World War when millions of civilians 
were either drafted or volunteered for service. Chapter Three analyses the experience of the Disciplinary 
Barracks during this time as the second significant event in the institution’s history that created an 
impetus for reform. The purely military system that developed between 1870 and 1914 experienced 
extreme pressure with the induction of millions of civilians into the military which resulted in minor 
reforms to the justice system to keep offenders out of prison, and major reforms to the prison itself. The 
Board of Review was established after the war and the practice of manacling prisoners in solitary 
confinement was banned. The end of isolation was brief, and the status of civil-military relations 
returned to normal shortly after the war. 
The Disciplinary Barracks system moved further towards Janowitz’s idea of convergence during 
the Second World War. Chapter four analyses the unique circumstance of the Second World War and 
the effect on the Disciplinary Barracks as an institution. Unlike the post-Reconstruction period or the 
First World War, the state of civil-military relations during the Second World War was more favourable 
towards the military. The military was not isolated in its values like it had been before, and as such the 
public were more supportive of its institutions. This led to the development of the Disciplinary Barracks 
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into a convergent institution that combined military and civilian ideologies. Because the Cold War 
started directly after the Second World War, many military institutions became permanent fixtures in 
America. Leavenworth was one of the military institutions that became a permanent fixture. 
Since the passage of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Disciplinary Barracks has been a 
permanent institution. Because of its permanent status, the institution has benefitted from the lessons 
of the past. Reform no longer takes a massive shock such as a world war to be forced through. Several 
amendments have been made to the system since it achieved permanent status, but none as drastic as 
previous periods. The Vietnam War era brought several reforms to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
but nothing on the scale of the previous three events of intersection.13 
  
                                                          
13 For a more comprehensive history of military justice reforms during the Vietnam War era see William Thomas 




Chapter One: The Existing Sources and what they Lack 
The history of the United States Disciplinary Barracks has been seriously neglected by academic 
historians. What few sources exist are written from the perspective of the military, either by personnel 
or those sympathetic to the army. As a result, the only prevailing school of thought on the development 
of military corrections takes the form of a whiggish narrative of progress driven by an inevitable wave of 
humanitarianism. The study of military corrections would benefit from the broader historical analysis 
that the history of civilian penology has undergone. Because there is more scholarly interest in civilian 
corrections, there has been an evolution in scholarship from a view of natural human progression 
towards more civilised methods, driven by a wave of humanitarianism in the nineteenth century, via 
more critical revisionist and Foucauldian views, to the more neutral view which takes into account 
external factors that affected reform efforts. This chapter will review this development of the 
scholarship surrounding civilian incarceration as a form of punishment and define the differing schools 
of thought as to what factors drove this reform. This provides a framework within which to criticise the 
existing historiography on the Disciplinary Barracks and shows where this thesis fits in within the 
broader historiography of military corrections.  
Incarceration as punishment is a relatively new idea in human history. Although jails and prisons 
have existed for hundreds, even thousands of years, their purpose was not to punish but rather to hold 
offenders until they were tried, or until their actual sentence could be carried out. Sentences for 
criminals before the eighteenth century were often dominated by corporal punishment such as flogging, 
breaking on the wheel, or hanging. But after the eighteenth century there was a backlash against such 
brutal punishments, and so reformers looked to other methods of punishment which were considered 
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more humane.14 Debate within the scholarship continues as to the cause of to this humanitarian 
development within the criminal justice system. Crime historians before the 1960s argued that this was 
driven by a wave of humanitarianism which swept Europe. Based on this interpretation of history, 
humanitarianism was a natural progression. Historian Pieter Spierenburg labels these works as 
narratives of reform which “…presented a factual story, often naïvely, with emphasis on the benevolent 
motives of the actors involved.”15 One such example is Martin Southwood’s 1957 biography of John 
Howard, which chronicles his life as a prison reformer.16 The scholarship evolved from these kinds of 
narratives in the 1960s and 1970s when sociologists became interested in the institutionalisation of 
incarceration and its effects on social control. For example, Terrance Morris and Pauline Morris 
conducted a sociological study of Pentonville prison in 1963, one of the first which looks at sociological 
factors of social control rather than focusing on the efficacy or humanitarianism of certain penal 
methods.17 Motivated by what a modern observer would consider inhumane practices within prisons 
both of the reform period and of modern times, these studies led to a revisionist approach to the history 
of incarceration which challenged the humanitarian assertion of the earlier interpretations. As well as 
Morris and Morris’ study of Pentonville, other historians and sociologists began looking at more societal 
factors which contributed to the use of incarceration in Western society as a primary form of 
punishment. As historian Michael Meranze argues, the historiography of the late twentieth century 
problematises the narrative of humanitarian progress evident in the previous scholarship. On the 
subject of revisionists such as Rothman, Ignatieff, and Foucault, Meranze states that “Each as well, by 
                                                          
14 Edward Peters, ‘Prison before the Prison’ in The Oxford History of the Prison: The Practice of Punishment in 
Western Society, Norval Morris and David Rothman Edit, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 3. 
15 Pieter Spierenburg, The Prison Experience: Disciplinary Institutions and their Inmates in Early Modern Europe, 
(London; Rutgers University Press, 1991), p. 1. 
16 Martin Southwood, John Howard, Prison Reformer; An Account of His Life and Travels, (London; Independent 
Press Limited, 1957), pp. 30-54. 
17 Terence Morris and Pauline Morris, Pentonville: A Sociological Study of an English Prison, (London; Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 1. 
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means of his historical construction, sought to show that, whatever the benefits of the decline [in 
corporal and capital punishments]—and none denied those—the forms that took their place were not 
transcendently rational but were themselves complex institutions of domination.”18 Historian Clive 
Emsley, however, critiques the revisionist and Foucauldian model for the dismissal and the 
“marginalizing of genuine humanitarian aspirations among penal reformers” during the nineteenth 
century as an “unhistorical moral judgement.”19 Spierenburg has offered similar criticism of the 
revisionist model saying that “In other fields of historical inquiry serious analysis likewise has been 
substituted for a naïve desire to praise or to blame the actors involved.”20 In short, the earlier histories 
place too much emphasis on the humanitarian intentions of the reformers without taking into account 
the results, whereas revisionist works unfairly discount the intentions of those reformers based on those 
results. As Emsley argues, it is necessary to adopt an analytical approach which tries to understand the 
motivations of the penal reformers in their historical and cultural context, while at the same time 
looking to broader political, societal, and economic factors which influenced the ways in which attempts 
at prison reform turned out. 
With Emsley’s criticism of civilian penology in mind, it is clear that the existing scholarship on 
the Disciplinary Barracks shares much in common with early civilian historiography. Limited academic 
interest in the subject has resulted in a tradition of whiggish interpretation of the development of 
military corrections, with little deviation from the narrative of progress and little criticism of the system. 
There are four main sources written on the history of the Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, all 
from members of the military or those sympathetic to it. Most are available digitally on the Defense 
                                                          
18 Michael Meranze, Laboratories of Virtue: Punishment, Revolution, and Authority in Philadelphia 1760-1835, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1996), p. 5. 
19 Clive Emsley, Crime, Police, and Penal: European Experiences, 1750-1940, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), p. 160. 
20 Peter Spierenburg, “From Amsterdam to Auburn: An Explanation for the Rise of the Prison in Seventeenth 
Century Holland and Nineteenth-Century America”, Journal of Social History, vol. 20, no. 3, (1987), p. 439. 
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Technical Information Center (DTIC) database, and are presented as an official narrative of the prison’s 
history. The first official history of Leavenworth was written by Henry Shindler in 1910.21 Shindler hints 
at his pro-military leanings in his preface by writing “If these contents serve those in authority the 
undersigned will deem it an ample reward for time and labor bestowed during his leisure hours.”22 
Shindler’s work presents a view of military corrections, which begins with the more barbaric methods of 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and moves to the more humane methods of 
incarceration. He quotes a report read before the House Committee on Military Affairs which stated that 
“A system based on the principles of humanity and reformation as well as justice, can, with lights of the 
present day, be adopted.”23 Shindler’s narrative does not critique the methods used in the early period 
of the institution’s history, and his narrative is similar to those of early histories written on civilian prison 
reform in the previous period. For example, Shindler praises the founder of the prison, Major Thomas F. 
Barr, for his humanitarian motivations. As with narratives of progress on civilian prisons, Shindler 
focuses on Barr’s motivations and applies them to the prison without analysing the results of the 
policies or even looking into whether or not the methods used could be considered humane. Shindler 
praises the institution by stating that “Considering all the obstacles to be overcome, and the short time 
the prison has been in operation, the results so far must be deemed highly satisfactory.”24 His sources 
mostly consist of official annual reports from the various governors, which he reads uncritically. 
Although Shindler presents a one-dimensional narrative without analysis of outside factors contributing 
to the development of the institution, his reliance on unpublished and unavailable primary sources 
makes his work invaluable to the study of the prison. 
                                                          
21 This work is not available on the DTIC database, but is in the public domain. Henry Shindler, History of the United 
States Military Prison, (The Army Service School Press, 1911). 
22 Henry Shindler, Preface to History of the United States Military Prison, (The Army Service School Press, 1911). 
23 Shindler, History of the United States Military Prison, p. 10. 
24 Ibid, p. 30. 
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As the first official history of the Disciplinary Barracks, Shindler’s book has become the starting 
point for historians wanting to continue the narrative, and as such each subsequent work continues his 
narrative of progress. The following sources have all been digitised and uploaded to the DTIC online 
database to create a historical narrative of Leavenworth. The next source which took up where Shindler 
left off was written in 1957 by Howard Jones, and was originally published serially in the Disciplinary 
Barracks’ prisoner publication, Stray Shots and was then published as a pamphlet in 1957 due to the fact 
that Shindler’s was the last official history of the prison.25 The similarity between the narratives 
presented by Jones and Shindler is understandable, given that the initial target audience of Jones’ work 
was inmates within the prison. With no criticism of the system, Jones simply recounts the events of the 
founding with Barr as the driving force in a manner similar to Shindler. Following Jones’ citation of 
Shindler, he simply gives a list of the numerous developments of the prison rather than giving reasons 
for their development. For example, Jones claims that during the development period of the early 
nineteenth century “The advanced concepts of reformation and rehabilitation were gradually being 
developed at the military prison.”26 Despite a brief mention of the fact that many “hindrances had to be 
overcome”, Jones does not mention details about these methods of reformation and rehabilitation, nor 
does he analyse whether or not they were successful. He then goes on to describe which buildings were 
built in what year, and when expansions to the perimeter wall were made.27 Again, this is a narrative of 
progress with little to no historical analysis. 
Following on from Jones, was the most recent comprehensive history of the Disciplinary 
Barracks written in 1978 by Major Jerry S. Price.28 Major Price’s work again takes up the Shindler 
narrative where Jones left it and continues with the same thematic approach, and makes clear his 
                                                          
25 Abstract in Howard N. Jones, USDB History, (Leavenworth: USDB Printing Press, 1957). 
26 Howard N. Jones, USDB History, (Leavenworth: USDB Printing Press, 1957) p. 6. 
27 Ibid, pp. 6-7 
28 Major Jerry S. Price, History of the United States Disciplinary Barracks, 1875-Present, (Fort Leavenworth: 
Combined Arms Research, 1978). 
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intentions to continue the narrative. “The purpose of this paper”, Price writes, “is to revise and update 
the existing historical documents into a comprehensive history of the United States Disciplinary 
Barracks.”29 Again, beginning with Barr’s humanitarian reform and then progressing towards a modern 
and humane institution with little to no criticism of the system. Price continues to focus on the physical 
development of the prison stating what facilities and assets were built and when, without analysing the 
wider social and political context. Like Shindler and Jones, Price also places a significant amount of 
emphasis on the rehabilitation programs being run through the prison, without analysing whether or not 
they were successful. Following on from his predecessor, Price offers little analysis of the First World 
War period, and makes several factual errors and erroneous claims which are addressed later in this 
thesis. The main issue with Price’s work is that it follows the same formula as Shindler and Jones in that 
it is a narrative of progress without criticism and without analysis of the wider historical context. 
The next work to continue the narrative of Leavenworth in the DTIC database was written by 
Raymond R. Youngs, a major in the US Military Police, who wrote a master’s thesis in 1983 entitled “A 
History of US Army Corrections”. Youngs follows the same descriptive formula as the previous sources, 
providing a factual account of the developments of Army Corrections since the beginning of the 
Republic. However, Youngs does touch on the issue of civilian pressure briefly in his conclusion. He 
states that: 
Public pressure and opinion can affect Army corrections in many ways. Desertion and AWOL 
have been two crimes causing the Army problems since it began. Part of the reason being the 
lack of public support for punishment of these crimes. This can be seen as late as the 1970’s 
when President Jimmy carter, influenced by public opinion, granted amnesty to deserters of the 
Viet Nam [sic] conflict. Without public support it is hard to control the situation. However, public 
                                                          
29 Price, History of the USDB, Abstract. 
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pressure can have positive effects, such as that directed at Army corrections in the late 1960’s 
which is probably the number one factor leading to improvements in the system. 
While Youngs does identify the importance of civilian pressure in the period following the developments 
of the 1960’s, he does not discuss the effects of civilian pressures in detail, he simply draws attention to 
them briefly. Furthermore, he does not use this aspect of analysis to explain the initial evolution of the 
United States Disciplinary Barracks at Leavenworth. This is an area where historical analysis needs to be 
improved. 
The most recent book on the Disciplinary Barracks was written in 2010 by Peter J. Grande, who 
was a former administrator at the prison.30 Grande does not mention his predecessors by name, but his 
narrative is written in the same style as Shindler and Jones. Although Grande’s book is a compilation of 
photographs with explanatory notes, in those notes and his introduction he presents the same view of 
the progression of the institution as Shindler, Jones, and Price before him. For example, Grande stresses 
the same theme of Barr’s humanitarian motivations in the creation of the prison, and does not critique 
the early methods of the institution.31 
While the above-mentioned sources constitute the only existing scholarship on the Disciplinary 
Barracks which uses a historical approach, there are sources from other disciplines which address the 
subject of military justice. These sources can be used to substitute the revisionist gap in the historical 
scholarship as they are often critical of the system in general. Military justice in general often comes to 
the attention of civilian academics, but they generally avoid the historical approach and instead focus on 
issues from a theoretical and contemporary perspective. During periods of civilian indifference, 
scholarship around military law generally comes from the military’s Office of the Judge Advocate 
                                                          
30 This is not available on the DTIC database, but is available in print. Peter J. Grande, Images of America: United 
States Disciplinary Barracks, (Charleston: Arcadia Publishing, 2010). 
31 Ibid, pp. 7-8. 
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General, published in the Military Law Review journal. Similar to Shindler, Jones, and Price, these 
sources are generally supportive of the military in the sense that they do not seriously critique the 
various aspects of military justice which are distinct from the civilian justice system. These sources are 
often supplemented or challenged by civilian academics during periods in which military justice garners 
public interest again. Whenever there is a war or other event involving a moral panic against military 
justice, there is a brief renewed interest in the subject. For example, in the wake of the Korean War 
Robert E. Joseph wrote an article for the Journal of Legal Education, drawing attention to the fact that 
many civilians were woefully ignorant on the subject of military law. 32 Joseph argued that a course on 
military law was necessary for all law students due to the passage of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
and the fact that many young American men, ignorant of military law, would find themselves in military 
service due to the needs of the Cold War. 33 However, with the exception of Joseph Bishop at Yale Law 
School, the subject of military justice remained the expert field of military academies and remained 
generally inaccessible to the public. As such, the study of military law is dominated by those within the 
military. 
The primary argument of the military is that because civilian and military justice both have such 
differing goals, two distinct systems must be maintained. According to John Wigmore, an American jurist 
who made a comparative study of military and civilian justice in 1920, the sole purpose of military 
justice is to maintain and restore discipline.34 The civilian penal system, argued Wigmore, cannot decide 
whether its purpose should be deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation or simply incapacitation of the 
offender.35 It is for these reasons, Wigmore argues, that a separate system is required to maintain the 
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discipline of the army and also to make military justice more efficient by keeping it out of the hands of 
the ineffective civilian system. To illustrate the difference between the civilian and military justice 
systems Joseph Bishop, a historian of military law, argues that there are four key reasons why the two 
systems must be kept distinct. Firstly, because the primary goal of military justice is to maintain 
discipline within the ranks, then punishment must be both swift and certain, which Bishop argues is not 
the case with the civilian justice system.36 As to why this is necessary, Bishop states that “An army 
without discipline is in fact more dangerous to the civil population (including that of its own country) 
than to the enemy.”37 Secondly, Bishop argues that because maintaining discipline is the responsibility 
of a unit’s commander that commander should have a measure of control over the system imposed to 
punish offenders. Such control is not possible under an impartial civilian system as maintaining discipline 
through punishment requires swift action.38 Thirdly, there is the argument that many infractions under 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice are not actually crimes in the civilian sphere. Offences such as 
insubordination and desertion have no civilian basis, and it is therefore difficult for civilians without a 
military background to judge and punish offenders who commit these crimes.39 The final reason Bishop 
gives is the fact that many military offences are committed by soldiers stationed overseas, and therefore 
outside the jurisdiction of US Federal Law.40 Without a separate justice system these soldiers would 
either be unaccountable for their actions, or would be held to account by the local laws and customs of 
the country they happened to be stationed in. Bishop’s arguments showing the need for two distinct 
systems helps to illustrate the tension between the civilian and military worlds, especially when certain 
events inspire a renewed public interest in the subject. It is this school of thought which generally 
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speaking has resulted in a lack of civilian scholarship on military justice, particularly on the subject of 
military corrections. 
The late 1960s and early 1970s sparked a renewed public interest in issues of military justice 
with events such as the Vietnam War, the My Lai Massacre, and the Presidio Mutiny. 41 The draft for the 
Vietnam War once again meant that civilians found themselves subject to military law. This was 
combined with events like the My Lai massacre which put the court-martial system into the public 
spotlight again, and the Presidio Mutiny which drew public attention to the conditions within military 
facilities of incarceration. These events sparked a renewed interest in the subject of military justice both 
from civilians and military sources. One example is the populist book Military Justice is to Justice as 
Military Music is to Music by Robert Sherill, written in the wake of the Presidio Mutiny, which argues 
that military justice is overly repressive, and needs to be completely civilianised. Sherill’s main 
contention is that the military justice system values the discipline of the army more than actual justice 
and is therefore unjust and in need of civilian based reform.42 Sherill summarises the debate as:  
The poles are quite distinct. At one end, the men who run the military system maintain that they 
must continue to have total domination over the lives of their personnel or the armed services 
will fall apart. At the other limit, many of the servicemen and their lawyers insist that they will 
accept no compromise, agree to no reform short of doing away with the military system of 
justice and delivering the servicemen to the jurisdiction of the civilian courts.43  
Furthermore, on the subject of the Presidio Mutiny Sherill states “The very success of public opinion in 
shaping some of the Presidio judgements only underscores the fact that many thousands of courts-
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martial send young men unjustly to prison without a voice being raised on their behalf.”44 Similarly, in a 
more academic style than Sherill, Edward F. Sherman, writing in 1973, argues that the separate system 
of civilian justice and military justice only made sense in an era of volunteer armies.45 In light of changes 
to the way in which the modern military is organized, Sherman argues that the military justice system 
should be civilianized as completely as possible in order to protect the rights of service personnel.46  
Seemingly in response to the same stimuli of the Presidio Mutiny, an article appeared in the 
Military Law Review entitled “The Constitutional Rights of Prisoners” written by Major Conrad Forays.47 
This was the first time since 1960 that the journal had addressed the military correctional system, so it is 
safe to assume that the article was inspired by the same event that inspired Sherill’s work.48 Foray 
argues that the perception of the soldier as outside the constitution is no longer relevant with the 
modern changes to the structure of the military, and prison administrators need to take into account 
their rights which are compatible with institutional necessity.49 According to Foray, Federal courts 
denied having any jurisdiction over military prisons to avoid hearing complaints of prisoners. He 
attributes this to “…a reluctance which undoubtedly stemmed from their recognition of the many 
problems faced by prison administrators and the courts’ own lack of expertise in the area.” He also 
states that complaints were inevitable in such a highly regulated environment.50 Although Foray calls for 
prison administrators to respect the constitutional rights of prisoners, he is not really changing the pro-
military rhetoric as he provides a wide scope for interpretation with his comment about “institutional 
necessity.” But at any rate, the fact that Foray’s article appears at the same time as civilian criticism in 
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the wake of the Presidio Mutiny does demonstrate that civilian agitation does have an effect on military 
scholarship. 
Revisionist civilian scholarship seems opposed to the pro-military argument for the existence of 
a separate military justice system. As part of this rhetoric for the civilianisation of the military justice 
system, two key critiques of the military correctional system emerged. Although most of the scholarly 
attention of the 1970s was focused on military law, there was a brief resurgence of interest in military 
corrections in 1970 and 1973. In 1970, in the wake of the Presidio Mutiny, the same event which 
inspired Sherill’s work on military law, a sociological enquiry into the United States military correctional 
system was conducted by Norman Eggleston and Stanley Brodsky.51 Eggleston and Brodsky’s edited 
compilation of sociological, criminological, and psychological works on military corrections was the first 
of its kind, bringing new sociological theories and critiques against military incarceration. For example, 
sociologist Richard L. Henshel contributed a chapter to the compilation entitled “Military Correctional 
Objectives: Social Theory, Official Policy, and Practice.”52 Henshel argues that the rehabilitative goals 
espoused by the military administration of the prison, which are also espoused by Shindler, Jones, and 
Price, are simply rhetoric. “The philosophy”, he states, “is something to be learned; something to have 
ready for recitation; it is not something to interfere with the day-to-day workings of the facility.”53 He 
further states that any improvement in military correctional policy is often linguistic rather than 
factual.54 Henshel argues, in contradiction to Wigmore and Bishop, that the military cannot agree on 
what the goal of military corrections should be, resulting in a policy that is influenced by internal and 
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external pressures rather than a policy that is rationally guided towards a specific goal. 55 He further 
emphasises this by pointing out that the existing theories on penology and criminology were formed 
with the civilian example in mind and therefore cannot be directly applied to the study of military 
corrections without adaptation. 56 Here, Henshel is giving credence to pragmatic alignment as a 
consequence of civilian pressure. However, he does not analyse the historical context that led to this, he 
simply observes it from a contemporary sociological perspective. 
In 1973 civilian attorney Robert Plotkin wrote an article entitled ‘Unknown Soldiers: The Plight 
of the Military Prisoners’.57 Plotkin argues that despite all of the advances in the procedures of military 
justice itself, the rights of the accused still end at the door to the military prison.58 He goes on to argue 
that public interest has been waning with rising negativity towards the military in general.59 Civil 
libertarians tend to focus on the rights of servicemen but leave out the rights of military prisoners. As 
Plotkin himself puts it: “It is ironic that in a country so passionately concerned with the treatment of its 
prisoners of war, the treatment of its own incarcerated soldiers has been so long neglected.”60 Again, 
Plotkin’s approach is from a legal perspective, not a historical one. His criticism is based on certain legal 
principles common to most of the American public. As such, his approach is similar to the revisionist 
school of civilian penology and would benefit from a broader historical analysis of the origins of the 
military correctional system. 
After Plotkin’s article, the issue of military justice faded from public interest again until recent 
developments. According to attorney Eugene Fidell, the War on Terror is bringing military justice back 
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into the public interest again.61 Fidell states that the War on Terror has sparked new debates over 
military justice, especially regarding the questions such as whether enemy combatants like Khalid Shaikh 
Mohammed should be tried by a federal district court or by a military commission. This debate has been 
hampered by civilian disengagement with military justice over the past thirty years, further 
demonstrating the effects of the ebb and flow of public interest in the subject.62  
The current scholarship on the subject of US military corrections is stagnant. Unlike the study of 
civilian penology, it has remained stagnant and failed to move beyond the whiggish narrative of 
progress. It is for this reason that this thesis fills the gap in the military historiography. Inspired by the 
framework provided by the evolution of scholarship on civilian prisons, this thesis first challenges the 
progressive narrative of the military sources, and provides broader explanations for what guided the 
development of military corrections. At the same time, one must be careful of falling into the same trap 
as the revisionists of the civilian school. To that end, this thesis seeks to understand the motivations of 
the reformers, particularly Thomas Francis Barr, while at the same time analysing the external political 
and societal factors which guided the institutional development of the Disciplinary Barracks. This 
approach will advance the historiography on military corrections by bringing it into line with the parallel 
civilian counterparts. Particularly, by focusing on the external and internal pressures forced on the 
system by civilians.  
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Chapter Two: Thomas Barr and the Origins of Reform 
The United States Disciplinary Barracks was not developed as the result of isolated military 
reform. It was not a matter of isolated military development, but rather it was influenced by wider 
socio-economic and political forces, what sociologist Richard L. Henshel refers to as the “pushes and 
pulls from external pressures.” 63 However, Henshel does not define in detail what these “pressures” 
are, leaving a gap in the historical analysis of how the prison came to be. This chapter will fill the gap left 
by Henshel by explaining the origin of the Disciplinary Barracks, where it came from and how it 
developed. Understanding the relative isolation of the United States Army in relation to civilian society 
during the nineteenth century is a key factor in explaining the development of the Disciplinary Barracks. 
By analysing the pressures of civil-military relations, this chapter demonstrates how the institution 
developed into one dominated by the purely military ideology of maintaining discipline and how it 
escaped from civilian oversight. Keeping in mind historian Clive Emsley’s critique of the Foucauldian 
revisionism of civilian penology, the motivations of the founder, Major Thomas Francis Barr, must be 
understood in their proper historical context. Therefore, this chapter will not offer an “unhistorical 
moral judgement” of the Army’s motivations, but rather analyse the historical context of civil-military 
relations which resulted in the system of military incarceration in use during the First World War. 
The ideological isolation of the US military in relation to civilian society is a key factor in 
explaining the external pressures which effected the development of the Disciplinary Barracks at Fort 
Leavenworth. This can be explained through analysis of the historiography of civil-military relations. 
There is a significant amount of scholarship on the subject of civil-military relations in the United States 
which further reinforces this idea. Although civil-military relations have been a contentious issue in 
America since the Revolution, the subject did not receive serious academic attention until after the 
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Second World War when civilian control of the military once again became a major concern for 
American politicians. According to sociologist Morris Janowitz, scholarship on the effect of military 
institutions on the political process began after the Second World War, and it was the first time since 
Alexis de Tocqueville that any serious attention was devoted to the study of civil-military relations by 
scholars.64 In the wake of the largest mobilization in American military history, civilians and military 
officials alike were concerned with reaffirming the American principle of civilian control of the military in 
an era where a large standing army was still required to deter the Soviet Union. The first significant work 
to tackle this issue was The Soldier and the State, written by the political scientist Samuel P. Huntington 
in 1957. In order to better explain the ideal of objective control, Huntington looks back to the late 
nineteenth century and at the factors which contributed to the professionalization of the officer corps 
and how isolation from the general public led to the military developing its own culture of patriotism 
and sacrifice, distinctly separate from the cultural focus on individualism present in civilian society. 
Huntington argues that this isolation from civilian society, and the lack of public interest in military 
affairs, allowed the military to focus on professionalization. The result of this separation was that the 
military institutions which were founded at the time reflected the values of the military, rather than 
society in general. Therefore, the Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth may have been founded on 
principles related to subjective control and Janowitz’s theory of convergence, but it developed into a 
system based on objective control. This had significant consequences during the First World War. 
Huntington reinforces this idea of isolation by explaining what he considers the dominant 
civilian philosophy of the time; business pacifism. This ideology also further explains why American 
civilians were only concerned with military affairs when it involved matters of economy. According to 
Huntington, this ideology was focused on economic productivity and its proponents viewed war as both 
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immoral and wasteful. As a result, the adherents of business pacifism had a negative view of the military 
in general.65 Therefore, militarism fell out of vogue with an American populace devoted to economic 
productivity.66 Huntington states that “The prevalence of business pacifism made the dominant feature 
of post-1865 civil-military relations the complete, unrelenting hostility of virtually all the American 
community toward all things military.”67 Furthermore, Huntington adds that where the business pacifist 
idea differs is that it changes the struggle between the civilian and military spheres from one of 
institutions or social groups, into a struggle between two distinct and conflicting ways of life.68 Business 
pacifists believed that war was for the past because it had been rendered obsolete by industrialization. 
Because of this view, Huntington states, many business pacifists, such as Andrew Carnegie, believed that 
war could be guarded against by the Jacksonian ideal of an armed populace, rather than maintaining a 
standing army.69 Huntington also argues that as well as this growing hostility towards the military in 
general, few economic groups had interests which lined up with the military. As such, the military 
became isolated socially, politically, and economically from the rest of society. Huntington further 
argues that congressional policy reflected the ideals of business pacifism. Since the conclusion of the 
Civil War the annual budget for military expenditures decreased slowly.70 This led to the US army failing 
to keep up both with military technology, and in techniques with foreign powers. The resulting lack of 
funds meant that the military was unable to experiment with new techniques and technology.71 
However, Huntington argues that Congress were not overly concerned with how the military conducted 
its affairs at this point in history, so long as they stayed within their budgetary constraints.72 The 
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combination of lack of funds and lack of public interest allowed the military to develop its institutions in 
its own way, and Leavenworth was no exception. 
While Huntington’s ideas are foundational in the study of American civil-military relations, there 
has been debate amongst both his contemporaries and modern scholars on Huntington’s argument for 
the isolation of the officer corps. The first major challenge to Huntington came from Morris Janowitz, in 
his book The Professional Soldier, written in 1960. Janowitz, Huntington’s rival, claims that the extent to 
which the officer corps was isolated may be exaggerated, but he does concede that a degree of isolation 
did exist.73 Furthermore, historian John M. Gates, writing in 1980, argues that the officer corps was not 
isolated from the society it protected, but was rather more engaged than Huntington or Janowitz give 
them credit for. Gates uses statistics on demographics to argue that the officer corps was not physically 
isolated from society on the frontier, as the majority of the officers were stationed in larger eastern 
cities.74 Gates goes on to argue that those officers most involved in the professional development of the 
military were the least physically isolated from society, having more social contact with the civilian 
world than the rest of the army.75 He then goes on to argue against Huntington’s homogeneous view of 
Congress, arguing that neither full support nor condemnation of the military were universal stances 
among the politicians. In more recent years, social scientist Suzanne Nielson, writing in 2009, argues that 
Huntington fails to adequately address the influence that national political purposes can have on 
military institutions.76 Nielson’s is a key insight for the study of Leavenworth, as the Disciplinary Barracks 
was often subjected to congressional budget cuts for political reasons. Despite these disagreements, 
most scholars agree that Huntington’s ideas are foundational to the study of civil-military relations. 
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Nielson states that “Huntington’s framing of the issues involved remains an essential foundation on 
which evolving understandings rest.”77  
Despite the debate, modern scholars agree with Huntington’s analysis of the state of civil-
military relations in the late nineteenth century. Historian Charles A. Byler’s 2006 book, Civil-Military 
Relations on the Frontier and Beyond, is a comprehensive study of civil-military relations in late 
nineteenth century America. Byler’s argument demonstrates that, while individual officers may have 
had political connections with Congress, the corps in general stayed out of politics. Byler further argues 
that the public did have a negative view of the army in general in the late nineteenth century due to a 
combination of factors including Reconstruction, and the demographic make-up of the army.78 Byler also 
puts the lack of funding into political context, rather than making homogeneous claims about the 
opinions of Congress. According to Byler, support for the military during the Reconstruction period came 
primarily from the Republican majority, however this support ended when Reconstruction came to a 
close.79 Byler also separates the lower echelon soldiers from the officer corps. He demonstrates that 
during the nineteenth century the army was recruited from a decreasing section of the population, 
consisting mainly of the lower class. The public viewed the common soldiery as a group of “bummers, 
loafers and foreign paupers.”80 This further demonstrates that the American public had a generally 
negative view of the military during the late nineteenth century. As such, both of these schools of 
thought on the ideological isolation of the military are useful in explaining different elements of how the 
Disciplinary Barracks developed as an institution, both in ideology and in the correctional methods used 
within the prison walls. 
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Thomas Francis Barr, the founder of the prison, does not fit into Huntington’s isolated officer 
stereotype and the existing military sources offer little analysis of the significance of his previous status 
as a civilian lawyer or his ideology. The progress narratives presented by Shindler, Jones, and Price give 
Barr a great deal of credit for providing the initial drive to reform military incarceration, but they do not 
provide much detail, nor do they analyse his character. For Jones and Grande, Barr is simply the founder 
of the institution, and that he is still known as the “father of the US military prison.”81 Price simply states 
that Barr’s letter to the Secretary of War in 1871 requested that a military prison be considered “for 
reasons of economy and the existing lack of Department of War control over military offenders in state 
institutions.”82 As with previous facts about the early development of the Disciplinary Barracks, Shindler 
was the source for this insight. Shindler does go into further detail than his successors by offering a brief 
personal history of Barr in which he gives limited details of Barr’s civilian education. According to 
Shindler, Barr was a lawyer in his civilian life, served as a civil servant in Washington during the Civil War, 
after which he entered into private practice.83 Shindler then states that Barr was transferred to the 
Regular Army on 26 February 1867. Here, Shindler has omitted a crucial fact which differentiates Barr 
from the isolated officer class which Huntington argues for. According to the Who Was Who in America 
entry for Barr, he was appointed as a Major in the Judge Advocates on 26 February 1865.84 The 
significance of this is that Barr never attended West Point, nor did he ever serve in the military proper. 
As such he does not represent the stereotype of Huntington’s isolated nineteenth-century US military 
officer. Barr was a civilian lawyer who gained his knowledge of US military law from his time as a civil 
servant in Washington. This shows that there is a civilian influence even at the very beginning of the 
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Disciplinary Barrack’s inception, making Barr’s ideology an important component in understanding 
where the drive for reform came from. 
Barr’s ideology fits the description of the liberal Republican reformers of the Gilded Age. In his 
book, “The Best Men”, historian John G. Sproat argues that a class of educated liberal Republicans 
emerged after the Civil War that took a moderate approach to reform. “Liberal reform”, Sproat argues, 
“was pre-eminently the instrument of the ‘best men’ in American society...”85 For Sproat, these were 
men who shared a liberal ideology rooted in the Republican tradition and had a positive view of the 
outcomes of the Civil War. According to Sproat, “most liberals were optimists, confident that the Civil 
War had been a creative experience rather than a sterile national disaster.”86 While they shared an 
“orthodox liberalism that is idealistic and sternly inflexible”, they still had a moderate approach to 
reform.87 
Barr fits the description of one of Sproat’s “best men” liberal Republican reformers. While Barr’s 
works on military penology are scarcely available, his works in other areas offer a glimpse into his 
personal ideology. This reinforces the idea that the development of the Disciplinary Barracks has been 
the result of civilian pressure and civil-military relations rather than just a whiggish progression or a 
military method of control through discipline. The first example is his character and how he was 
perceived by his peers. An article in The National Tribune from 28 March 1889 claimed that Barr “is 
learned in the law, and in military law especially is as high authority as Col. Winthrop or even Col. Lieber. 
He has an eminently judicial mind, and has also that enviable quality of thorough impartiality that 
enables him to thoroughly sink himself and see only the right or wrong of a question and the good of 
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service.”88 By comparing Barr to the two most prominent scholars of military law at the time, this article 
reinforces his academic qualifications, presenting him as an eminently worthy leader of the reform 
movement. However, it must be acknowledged that this view was confined to military and veteran 
circles. The National Tribune was a publication which catered to veterans and published mostly military 
affairs and stories. While it is difficult to analyse Barr’s impact on the civilian public, it is relevant that 
military circles viewed him in the same way that liberal Republicans viewed the leaders they thought 
ought to bring about the liberal reform they desired. 
As well as the way he was perceived by his peers, Barr’s ideology also ties him to the liberal 
Republican movement of moderate reform. He held many of the views which Sproat identifies as 
representative of the liberal Republican movement. For example, in 1879 Barr gave a speech about how 
the Civil War should be commemorated in which he said “our tributes are not paid to courage…It was no 
gladiatorial contest in which we were engaged-a test of physical prowess of sections. It was a death 
grapple between right and wrong.” 89 This demonstrates that Barr held the moral view, shared by liberal 
Republicans at the time, that there was no moral equivalency in the Civil War. The North was morally 
right in its quest to defeat slavery, and the South was unequivocally wrong in defending it. Furthermore, 
Barr echoed the liberal sentiments in a paper he delivered on 13 December 1888 before the Military 
Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States entitled ‘Costs and Compensations of the War.’ In it, he 
states that “The world never before witnessed a more majestic uprising of a people. Great armies have 
been gathered by the Caesars and Napoleons of history, through the exercise of despotic authority, to 
destroy rival powers; but this was the springing forth of a people to maintain the integrity of their 
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country and demonstrate the strength of a republic…”90 This quote ties Barr to Sproat’s argument that 
“most liberals were optimists, confident that the Civil War had been a creative experience rather than a 
sterile national disaster.”91 Reinforcing this sentiment, Barr states that “This was the great immediate 
compensation. The cruel wrongs inflicted upon a timid race had been expiated in perfect retribution…”92 
In the same speech, Barr further tied himself to the liberal Republican ideology by stating that “We as a 
nation are moving forward on true lines to that high position in the domain of government where the 
rights of the humblest will be as honestly conceded and as sacredly guarded as the rights of the most 
richly endowed with intellect and wealth.”93 Here, Barr confirms his desire for liberal reform in the sense 
that government should protect the rights of the individual, no matter their position in society. This 
demonstrates that Barr himself was a liberal Republican reformer, explaining where the initial idea for 
reform of the Disciplinary Barracks system came from. Not from the West Point bred officer class, but 
from a civilian lawyer educated in Massachusetts.  
Barr’s ideology provides further context for the report he co-authored detailing the British 
military prison system that he observed in Canada. While it was co-authored by Barr and three other 
career officers, his liberal Republican influence can be seen throughout the report. For example, the 
report states that “The evils of our own methods have been pointed out, and it is hoped that our service 
may be strengthened by their abandonment and the adoption of a system more in consonance with 
humanity and enlightened views of the present day.” 94 Furthermore, the report states of the conditions 
of the prisoners at Castle Williams that “Very little hard labor can be found for them by the post 
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commandant, and living together, as they do, in casemates, which are never well adapted for prison 
purposes, their punishment is neither reformatory nor in accordance with their sentences.”95 Placing 
emphasis on humane ideals and “enlightened” views echoes Sproat’s definition of the liberal Republican 
as being convinced of progress and “the perfectibility of man.”96 The report goes on to state that during 
the inspection the board was “continually cautioned to bear in mind that the chief object of establishing 
a prison exclusively for military offenders is to maintain discipline in the Army, to reform offenders, and 
to repress repetition of military offences.”97 While it could be argued that this is further evidence of 
Henshel’s argument that military corrections cannot make up its mind about what the goals of 
incarceration should be, it could also be argued that this demonstrates a desire to integrate both the 
military ideas of maintaining discipline with the civilian ideas of humane reform. From the military point 
of view, it is vital to maintain the discipline of the army by punishing military offenders and deterring 
further offences. But that does not discount the liberal Republican view of the “perfectibility of man” in 
the sense that they can be reformed. This all demonstrates that, thanks to Barr’s combined civilian 
background and military status, the prison began as a cooperative effort at creating a military institution 
which integrated liberal Republican elements that were prominent during the Gilded Age. 
The impetus for reform may have been provided by the liberal sentiments of Barr, but they were 
to be implemented by military men. The “father of the US military prison” may contradict the 
nineteenth-century stereotype for a US army officer, but the early commandants do not. Those in 
charge of the day-to-day running of the institution had the most influence over how the founding 
principles were enforced, which is why it is important to analyse their background. The first 
commandant of the prison, Major James M. Robertson, was a veteran of both the Mexican War and the 
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Civil War. According to Shindler, Robertson gained “several brevets for distinguished, gallant, and 
meritorious service.”98 Robertson may not have attended West Point, but he was a career officer who 
earned his promotions in the field. Robertson served as commandant from June 1875 until March 1877, 
at which point he was replaced by Major Asa Peabody Blunt.99 Much like Robertson, Blunt was not a 
graduate of West Point, instead belonging to that class of men who volunteered for service during the 
Civil War and became ingrained in the military culture afterwards. Blunt served as commandant until 31 
December 1887, when he was replaced by a man who fit every stereotype of Huntington’s nineteenth-
century US Army officer. Captain James Worden Pope was a graduate of West Point, a decorated 
veteran of the Indian Wars, as well as the Spanish American War and the Philippine-American War.100 
Pope served as commandant at the Disciplinary Barracks from 1 January 1888 until its temporary closure 
on 30 June 1895. As such, in the early years the institution was run by purely military men who fit the 
stereotype of Huntington’s nineteenth-century officer class. 
The ideology of these men when it comes to military justice is vital in understanding the 
emerging contradictions between the founding principles versus the practices of the institution. The 
purely military idea of discipline can be understood by analysing the ideas of the commandant, Captain 
Pope. Pope delivered a speech entitled ‘Crimes and Criminals in the American Army’ before the 
American Prison Association on 31 October 1891, summarising the views of the military towards 
corrections. In the speech, he explains the system of military incarceration under his command at the 
Disciplinary Barracks, while revealing elements of his military ideology which contradict Barr’s. Firstly, in 
his opening remarks Pope reveals a much more cynical view of the progress of civilisation than that of a 
liberal Republican of the Gilded Age. Going against the optimistic liberal view of human progress, Pope 
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focuses on the advancement in destructive military technology that emerged from progress. He states 
that “in the closing years of the century most noted for its prodigious strides in all the arts and sciences 
suited for the amelioration of the human race, but perverted for the chief part to the abuses of human 
destruction.”101 Further reinforcing this cynical view of human progress, Pope goes on to say that “Even 
railways, those peaceful harbingers of increased social intercourse and friendly inter-communication, 
are chiefly diverted to the rapid transport of armed hosts to battle...”102 This is in direct contrast to the 
liberal Republican view of the inevitable human progress, arguing that progress is a double-edged sword 
which needs to be taken into account when preparing military policy. 
Pope uses this cynical breakdown of human progress to introduce his views on the necessity of 
military justice and maintaining the discipline of the army. Pope states that civilians ought to be 
interested in issues of military justice and maintain discipline due to how important it is for the defence 
of the nation.103 Pope begins by praising the reformatory movements of the 1870s and their 
humanitarian influences that guided the institution in the early years, reinforcing the mythos of the 
founding.104 But then he deviates from this idea, rejecting the ideas of cooperation with the civilian 
world towards isolation from it. On the military offence of desertion, Pope states that it is the most 
significant crime that the military justice system has to deal with.105 Obviously it is vital for military 
discipline that deserters are caught swiftly and punished accordingly, lest other soldiers get the idea that 
there will be no consequences for shirking their military duties. But Pope goes on to blame civilian 
sentiments for the prevalence of the crime of desertion, demonstrating the civil-military divide. He 
states that “The difficulty of suppressing this crime is much increased by the thoughtless sympathy 
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engendered amidst a peace-loving and restriction-hating people towards one escaping from an exacting 
code of which so little realize the necessity.”106 Further demonstrating his contempt for civilian 
sentiment, Pope states that “to dwell upon the crime [of desertion] would render this treatise too 
technical for this congress. It is sufficient to point to the supreme importance of its suppression and to 
indicate the detriment to army discipline which the uncalled for and thoughtless sympathy of civilians 
may occasion to that discipline.”107 Here Pope is saying that civilian ideology is so antithetical to all 
things military that they do not understand the necessities of military discipline, which in turn are vital 
to their protection from foreign military threats. As Pope argues, progress brings with it destructive 
military capabilities, and if civilians do not understand what is required for defence then it should be left 
to the military. This line of thinking has significant implications for the development of the correctional 
policy at Fort Leavenworth, as it demonstrates a general hostility towards civilian involvement. Based on 
this, it is clear that policy has shifted from the cooperative sentiment expressed in the report of the 
1871 inspection board, to a more isolated stance in keeping with Huntington’s idea of the nineteenth 
century officer class. 
Pope further demonstrates his hostility towards civilian involvement by his negative comments 
on civilian oversight of the prison. For Pope, civilian involvement inhibits the military’s ability to 
reinforce discipline, or adequately reform an offender. One example of Pope’s negative viewpoint is his 
opposition to the policy that under the establishing act, the War Department had the power to grant 
clemency to inmates it deemed worthy. Pope opposed this policy as it produced “constant restlessness 
among the inmates engendered by the hope and expectation of release without regard to conduct.”108 
Again, this is tied to his belief that civilians are in no place to make decisions that affect military 
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discipline. For Pope, the release of an offender should be solely up to the military, with no interference 
from civilian oversight. Furthermore, Pope is highly critical of the annual inspections conducted by the 
military commissions board. Under the inspection criteria, each prisoner was allowed access to the 
officials of the board to make complaints about the conditions and their treatment, with no penalty for 
false accusations. Pope states that this aspect of inspection “constitutes an evil, because while prisoners 
should be allowed great freedom in making complaints no man should be allowed to make accusations 
except under penalty for falsehood.”109 While this is a reasonable critique of the system, it still 
demonstrates Pope’s opposition to the inspection board. Inspections were run annually, so Pope was 
more responsible for the day-to-day running of the facility than them. 
The juxtaposition of Barr and Pope perfectly demonstrates the contradictions inherent in the 
underlying ideology of the prison and the day-to-day implementation of it. Barr represents the idealist 
reformer who focused on humanitarian reform in line with the liberal idealism of the era. Whereas Pope 
represents the cynical officer in charge of implementing idealistic reforms with limited resources and a 
lack of inclination. Barr’s liberal Republican ideology is at the root of the Disciplinary Barracks as an 
institution, but in the era of civil-military isolation, his reforms struggled to achieve greater pragmatic 
alignment.  
The pressures that influenced the development of correctional policy at Leavenworth were not 
limited to individual figure heads, as wider socio-economic factors were also involved. Barr’s push for 
reform represents internal and ideological pressures, while issues of funding and location represented 
wider external and political pressures. As Huntington identified with most other military issues of the 
era, the external pressure of economic concerns from the civilian world continued to influence the 
development of the Disciplinary Barracks. The first evidence of this can be found in the debate over the 
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location of the Disciplinary Barracks which demonstrates Huntington’s argument about civilian lack of 
engagement with military affairs during this period unless money was concerned. After Barr’s inspection 
of the British system of military prisons, the Secretary of War recommended that the House Committee 
on Military Affairs draft a bill for the establishment of a military prison. The board recommended two 
locations for the establishment of the prison, but the Committee on Military Affairs rejected these based 
on matters of economy. According to Shindler, the Committee believed that it would be cheaper to 
repurpose the buildings already at the Rock Island arsenal into suitable accommodation for prisoners 
rather than building an all new facility.110 As a further matter of economy, the Committee believed that 
some of the cost of upkeep could be offset by using prison labour in the cleaning, repair, and 
manufacture of munitions within the arsenal, thus rejecting the benefits of the British “shot drill.”111 But 
the Ordinance Board of the Army objected to the notion of allowing prisoners to work with munitions 
for obvious reasons. Despite these objections, Congress passed a bill on 3 March 1872 establishing the 
Disciplinary Barracks at the arsenal at Rock Island, Illinois. Secretary of War Belknap continued to press 
for the military argument that Rock Island was an unsuitable location for the prison and advocated that 
it be moved to the military reservation at Fort Leavenworth. A congressional debate ensued. 
Further confirming Huntington’s argument is the attention that the matter attracted in the local 
newspapers of Rock Island and Leavenworth respectively. National newspapers, or other state 
newspapers, paid little attention to the debate because as a military affair in the nineteenth century the 
public only paid attention when it affected their locality or major matters of economy. Both papers 
focus mostly on the economic benefits to their local area, rather than the benefits of the institution 
itself. The local paper of Rock Island, The Daily Argus, began attacking its own Congressman, John B. 
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Hawley, for supporting the motion to move the prison to Fort Leavenworth.112 In subsequent articles of 
The Argus the paper attacked Hawley, stating that because he was supporting the motion to move the 
prison from Rock Island he was refusing to represent the interests of his constituents in that he was 
denying them the government revenue that an institution like a military prison would inevitably bring to 
the state. 113 The Argus does mention a speech by the chairman of the House Committee on Military 
Affairs in support of the prison in which he stated that “it was in the interest of humanity and economy 
to have such an institution.”114 However, the paper tends to focus more on the economic issue of 
denying the local area the benefits of having a federally funded military institution, rather than the 
specifics of the institution itself. The fact that national and other state newspapers do not report on the 
debate in as much detail, or with as much vitriol, as the local papers of Rock Island and Leavenworth 
confirms Huntington’s argument that during the nineteenth century civilians were only really concerned 
with military affairs if they affected them in some way, including economically. 
The local paper for the county of Leavenworth, The Leavenworth Weekly Times, was naturally 
very supportive of the idea that the prison should be established at Fort Leavenworth rather than Rock 
Island. In an article from 6 August 1874 supporting the re-election of congressman William A. Philips, 
The Leavenworth Weekly Times lists among his accomplishments, securing the passage of the bill which 
moved the Disciplinary Barracks from Rock Island to Leavenworth, thus saving the government $80,000 
as they did not have to buy the land. 115 Furthermore, an article from 7 January 1875 again praises 
Philips for supporting the needs of his constituents by having the prison moved from Rock Island to 
Leavenworth. 116 Again, the paper focuses on the economic benefits to the local area of having a 
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federally funded military institution established there rather than the benefits of the institution itself. 
This confirms the conclusions of the scholarship on civil-military relations and shows that the argument 
applies to the development of the Disciplinary Barracks. In other words, the lack of public interest 
contributed to the lack of civilian oversight over the development of the Disciplinary Barracks as an 
institution. 
Location issues aside, the Act included provisions for civilian oversight, stating that the rules and 
regulations of the prison would be determined by a five-member commission, three of which would be 
military officers and two would be civilians.117 Shindler states that this was done because “the 
committee deemed it best that the institution should not be inspected and managed exclusively by 
officers of the army, but that civilians, who may have an eye to humanity and reformation, who have 
devoted years of thought to the subject, perhaps more than army officers, should cooperate in the 
work.”118 This shows that the initial intentions of reforming the system were not only based on the 
functional problem of correcting army discipline, but by a humanitarian concern for the treatment of 
offenders. Thus, fulfilling both the functional and societal imperatives of the institution. 
Despite this initial humanitarian and functional move for reform, as Sproat points out, liberal 
reform during this era was based on moderation and limited in scope.119 Because of the political and 
cultural factors previously discussed, the prison did not develop along the idealistic lines first intended. 
As Huntington argued, Congress was content to remain disengaged with military affairs during this 
period so long as the military did not exceed their budget.120 Even after the location of the prison was 
moved to a site deemed acceptable by both parties, the budgetary problems indicative of civil-military 
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relations of the era continued. Congress cut the funding of the governing board of the prison meaning 
there could be only three members. 121 Therefore, the actual board merely consisted of three military 
officers and no civilians. The recollection of Zebulon Brockway, a prominent civilian penal reformer and 
intended member of the Disciplinary Barracks inspection board, on the subject further demonstrates the 
lack of civilian engagement with military matters during the period. In his autobiography, Brockway 
states that he was to be on the commission for the proposed military prison at Rock Island, Illinois, but 
this never came to be as a lack of congressional funds prevented the prison from being built.122 
Brockway does not mention the fact that the military prison was in fact built, just at a different location. 
He just briefly states what his proposed involvement was supposed to be before funding was cut and 
then moves on to the position he held next. The fact that Brockway devoted so little attention to 
recording his proposed involvement in the project, even to the extent that he recorded incorrect 
information about the Disciplinary Barracks, shows that civilians, even prominent prison reformers like 
Brockway, fail to engage with military affairs during times of peace. 
With civilian oversight removed from the prison, and a lack of public interest in military 
institutions due to the state of civil-military relations at the time, it is difficult to analyse whether the 
institution was successful during the initial period of development, 1876-1895. The available military 
sources including Shindler, Jones, and Price, provide a generally positive view of the development of the 
institution. Shindler offers little analysis of his own, however he does quote verbatim sections of annual 
reports from the commandants stating that progress in the prison was satisfactory during the period in 
question.123 Furthermore, Jones’ history, which borrowed heavily from Shindler, tells a similar story of 
the progressive development of military correctional methods in rehabilitating offenders. Jones states 
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that during this early period “The advanced concepts of reformation and rehabilitation were gradually 
being developed at the military prison.124” Major Price, Jones’ successor in the history of the institution, 
borrowed heavily from both his predecessors and tells the same story of progressive development of 
the reformation and rehabilitation programs. For example, the first vocational training program for 
offenders was started in 1877 in which the inmates were employed in making shoes for the army.125 
With little to no civilian oversight, and the available military sources being analysed by members or ex-
members of the military, the facts are presented as mostly positive. It is more likely evidence of 
Henshel’s statement that “The philosophy is something to be learned; something to have ready for 
recitation; it is not something to interfere with the day-to-day workings of the facility.”126 
With the civil-military dichotomy of the nineteenth century in mind, an in-depth analysis of one 
of the first reports commissioned by the board demonstrates the issue with having a solely military 
institution of corrections. One of the first annual reports was conducted in 1878 and was a glowing 
review of the correctional methods employed and of the strict discipline adhered to within the 
institution. The report was commissioned by Secretary of War George McCrary in 1878 for the attention 
of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs and the inspection was carried out by General Randolph B. 
Marcy on 11 October 1878.127 According to Marcy there were 373 convicts and two military prisoners 
incarcerated at the time of his inspection.128 Marcy claims that under the prison’s governor, Asa Blunt, 
those inmates were being handled “efficiently” and without any breach of discipline, and without any 
illegal punishments having to be inflicted.129 He further states that the inmates were given ample 
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opportunity to make formal complaints about conditions within the prison and chose not to do so.130 
Given Pope’s negativity to the practice of allowing inmates unimpeded access to the inspecting officer 
this comment leaves much to be desired. As for the disciplinary methods, inmates were forbidden from 
talking except while under the direction of an officer or provost sergeant of the prison.131 The prison 
regulations stated that “prisoners shall be kept at hard labour daily.”132 While the regulations on labour 
do not mention a specific punishment for refusing to work, it is implied by the disciplinary regulations 
that punishment would be confinement in solitary. This is the punishment set out for those inmates who 
refuse an order given by an officer or guard.133 However, Marcy’s report is problematic. The prison had 
only been active for three years when McCrary commissioned the report. But also, it is from the 
perspective of the military administration and it is only on Marcy’s word that the prisoners had no 
complaints about the harsh discipline of military justice. However, it is reports such as these that 
provide the source material for the whiggish narratives of progress. While they provide a positive look at 
the running of the prison, they are only a snapshot of what went on at the prison. As previously 
mentioned, the inspection commission, however thorough their inspection might have been, they were 
only seeing a snapshot of the prison. It was the commandants and prison administration that were really 
in charge of the day to day running of the prison. As such, the positive aspects of the report must be 
read critically as they do not reveal all aspects of the prison, particularly the experience of the inmates. 
Much of what Marcy says in his report is confirmed in several newspaper articles about the 
prison. Although there was no official civilian oversight of the Disciplinary Barracks, reporters from the 
Leavenworth Times would occasionally be allowed access to the prison and would report on what they 
saw. But it must be kept in mind that they would have seen even less of the day-to-day running of the 
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facility than the commissioners. For example, on 8 July 1875 a Times reporter explored the prison and 
wrote that the governor does not treat the prisoners “with that harshness and severity that outsiders 
are often led to believe.”134 Furthermore, another Times reporter visited the prison on 12 August 1875 
and gave another positive review of the prison and treatment of the inmates, stating “The majority of 
the citizens of the West do not fare better than do the inmates of the United States Military Prison.” 135 
Then again on 18 May 1876 The Times published another article on the prison in which the author 
stated that the conditions of the prison were “excellent” and that the regulations for the inmates were 
“mild and moderate.” 136 These articles seem to confirm the positive view of the prison espoused by 
Marcy’s report and by the military sources on the subject. From the outside, and selected images from 
the inside, the prison as a military institution appeared to be fulfilling both Huntington’s functional and 
societal imperatives. 
What limited sources there are from inside the prison contradict this image, and hint towards 
what was revealed of the prison conditions during the First World War. As previously stated, sources 
from inside the prison during this period are scarce as professional soldiers tend not to be as motivated 
to write memoirs as civilian draftees. Yet there are enough sources to create a snapshot of what was 
going on which is confirmed in the next chapter by analysis of the First World War. The first example is a 
vague article in The Leavenworth Weekly from 22 July 1875 about the death of a military prisoner. 
According to the article, a prisoner named Richard O’Brien was beaten to death by a guard and the 
military authorities refused to let a civilian coroner into the prison, because the facility was under 
military jurisdiction.137 Again, this highlights the issues of civil-military relations of the era which run as a 
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common theme throughout the early history of Leavenworth. A prisoner was apparently beaten to 
death by a guard named Sergeant Hogan, but the lack of civilian oversight blocks any further analysis of 
the conditions under which he was killed. In addition to this, the only first-hand account from inside the 
prison during the pre-war period comes from notorious serial killer, Carl Panzram. In his memoir, which 
he wrote when he was on death-row at the civilian United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Panzram 
recounted briefly his experience at the Disciplinary Barracks. Panzram lied about his age to join the 
army. He refused to work, so he was brought before the company commander. The commander gave 
him a copy of the Articles of War, which Panzram desecrated. For such action, he was confined in the 
guardhouse until he was court-martialled. He tried to steal army overcoats, a civilian suit, and a 
pocketful of gold buttons, for which he was sentenced to three years at Leavenworth.138 Panzram served 
37 months, six of which he spent shackled to an iron ball and chain as punishment for misconduct. As 
the lowest tier prisoner, the hard labour of his sentence consisted of working in the quarry, and being 
fed on “stinking codfish, greasy stew or mouldy and wormy rice or beans.”139 He goes on to say that “all 
that treatment did one good thing for me. The worse the food was and the harder they worked me, the 
stronger I got.”140 Although the death of O’Brien and the recollections of Panzram are not conclusive 
evidence to contradict the previously mentioned positive view of the prison, they do offer a brief 
snapshot of life inside the prison. In a similar manner to civilian prisons at the time, the death of O’Brien 
hints at the cruelty of the guards which contradicts the rhetoric of rehabilitation and reform. The fact 
that the death was not investigated by civilian authorities further confirms the isolation of the facility 
and limited public interest. As for Panzram’s memoirs, his attitude betrays a sense of utter contempt for 
the reformative goals of the prison, being subjected to the harshest punishments the system allowed 
for. Of course, Panzram was not a typical prisoner, as he went on to become a renowned serial killer 
                                                          
138 Thomas E. Gaddis and James O. Long, Panzram: A Journal of Murder, (Los Angeles: Amok, 2002), p. 36. 




after he left the army. However, his memoir does reveal the focus on maintaining discipline over the 
rehabilitative goal stated in the rhetoric through the hard labour he had to engage in as well as the ball-
and-chain punishment he had to endure for his infractions. While not enough to conclusively disprove 
the positive conclusions of the military sources, these two sources from inside the prison hint towards 
the fact that the rhetoric of rehabilitation did not necessarily line up with reality. 
One event which contradicts the military story of progressiveness and success is the fact that 
Congress decided to close the prison down in 1895. While reinforcing the socio-economic and political 
arguments of the pressures of civil-military relations, this event also allowed civilian administrators to 
inspect the prison facilities. The military sources state that the Secretary of War begrudgingly admitted 
to Congress that the military could survive returning to the previous system of incarceration within 
multiple stockades.141 Price also states that the same arguments that were made in the past for the 
need to establish the prison in the first place were used to justify its closure. In the 1870s the reformers 
argued that first-time military offenders were being placed in close proximity to hardened and 
incorrigible ones.142 Then, this argument was used again to close the Disciplinary Barracks at 
Leavenworth, as certain Army officers argued that a similar environment existed within the new 
prison.143 There were also economic reasons for the closure of the prison. Price states this, and 
Huntington’s analysis of the era confirms the mood of Congress at the time. Military spending was low 
on the agenda, and the Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth seemed like an unnecessary 
extravagance. 
There were also political reasons for the closure. The failure of the legislation passed by 
Congress in 1891, known as the “Three Prisons Act” also provided the Department of Justice with 
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another motive for seeking the closure of the Disciplinary Barracks.144 The act established the first 
federal prison system by authorising the Department of Justice to purchase three sites on which to build 
new prisons. However, the act was a failure as it did not provide enough funds to do what was 
authorised. Therefore, it was in the Department’s best interests to have the Disciplinary Barracks 
transferred to its control as it would be used as the first federal penitentiary. This again demonstrates 
the effect of civil-military relations on the development of the Disciplinary Barracks. Priority was mostly 
given to civilian projects over military ones. 
Once the Department of Justice took control of the former Disciplinary Barracks at Leavenworth 
on 30 June 1895, civilian officials had their first look at the facilities and found them severely lacking. 
Although the new civilian governor of the prison, J.W. French, did not have an opportunity to witness 
the army’s correctional methods in action, his damning report on the inadequate state of the facility 
reveals the different correctional standards of the civilian administration and the military. For example, 
the attorney general, based on the reports of Warden French, stated that “Besides, the buildings not 
having been constructed with a view to the confinement of desperate criminals, but only as a military 
prison, a much larger force of guards is required than would otherwise be necessary.”145 The report 
recommended that a brand-new facility be constructed elsewhere on the Fort Leavenworth reservation, 
and that the old Disciplinary Barracks be returned to the army.146 The fact that the facilities did not meet 
the standards of the civilian Department of Justice demonstrates the isolation of the military from the 
public because the two spheres had such different views on the issue of corrections that were not 
always compatible. It also shows that the positive reports from the military sources without civilian 
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oversight do not necessarily tell the full story about the asserted success of the Disciplinary Barracks as a 
correctional facility. 
Although the Disciplinary Barracks was founded on liberal principles and on the idea of 
cooperation between civilians and the military, the pressures of nineteenth century civil-military 
relations pushed its development towards a more isolated military path. The result was a system purely 
designed to deal with professional volunteer soldiers, and to maintain the discipline of the army. 
Because the system had little to no civilian oversight, and because the public was uninterested in 
military affairs during peace time, only small glimpses of the harsh methods can be seen. Most sources 
only take a superficial look at the institution and as such present a positive view of it based on the 
rhetoric of its founding. But what few sources there are from the inside of the prison are contradictory, 
and with no civilian oversight it is difficult to conclusively analyse whether or not the methods were 
successful. What can be argued however, is that the system that developed was one designed to 
maintain the discipline of professional soldiers through strict enforcement of the regulations. When the 
prison was returned to military control in 1906, this system was re-established. It was this system that 
came under immense pressure during the First World War civilian draft, which provided a more in depth 




Chapter Three: Laymen in Leavenworth 
When the United States entered the First World War, many civilians found themselves inducted 
into the ranks of the military, whether they wanted to be or not. This influx of both unwilling and 
inexperienced citizen-soldiers into the ranks of the military placed considerable strain on the military 
justice system, and on the correctional system which was developed over the previous thirty years. This 
chapter will assess the period of the First World War, looking at the strain placed on the correctional 
system by civilian draftees, and the conditions inmates were subjected to. This chapter will first explain 
the legislation which placed civilian draftees under military law and the problems which were caused by 
having so many civilians in military service. In order to analyse the problems with the military 
correctional system it will also be necessary to understand the issues with sentencing the guilty under a 
general court-martial proceeding. This chapter will then contrast the military sources’ positive 
assessment of how the Disciplinary Barracks fared in such a difficult situation with the testimonials of 
conscientious objectors who experienced the most brutal elements of the system. The experiences of 
conscientious objectors brought the conditions of military incarceration into the public eye, which led to 
eventual reform of the system. The inner workings of the prison in contrast with the reported success of 
the correctional system reveals that there is an inherent contradiction in the military’s rhetoric of 
rehabilitation, and a flaw in the military argument that improvement in military corrections has been the 
result of internal institutional growth. The result of pressures this period was limited pragmatic 
alignment which stopped when public interest faded. 
It was the military’s unfair sentencing system of general court-martial which first brought the 
military justice system to the attention of the public. Many men found themselves incarcerated at 
Leavenworth for trivial charges after receiving unfairly harsh sentences. Therefore, an understanding of 
the court-martial system and the attention it garnered is necessary in analysing issues with the 
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correctional system of the time. In 1919 the most vocal advocate for military justice reform, Samuel T. 
Ansell, was quoted in The New York Times as saying “The sentences imposed for slight offences by 
courts-martial have shocked every sense of justice. They have reached the heights of injustice. The 
sentences in many instances bore no reasonable relationship to the offenses committed.”147 Ansell’s 
primary concern at the time was reforming the military court-martial system, and preventing alleged 
military offenders from entering the military correctional system in the first place. While the conditions 
of prisoners at Leavenworth and the various branches of the Disciplinary Barracks did get public 
attention during the war, the focus was on reforming the military justice system, not the military 
correctional system. Therefore, one must first understand the debates around the reform of the court-
martial system in order to understand the experience of offenders who were incarcerated at 
Leavenworth.  
Even though draftees during the First World War were not volunteers, they were still subject to 
military law. Legislation that was passed at the time removed their status as civilians and placed them 
under the jurisdiction of the military justice system. Firstly, the Selective Service Act 1917 gave the 
President the power to draft civilians into military service as required.148 Then, Article 2 subparagraph 
(a) of the Articles of War 1916 placed said draftees under the jurisdiction of military law.149 Because of 
this, the Articles of War in their entirety applied to civilian draftees, whether they had volunteered for 
service or not. Article 12 of the Articles of War 1916 gave general courts-martial the authority to 
sentence anyone under the authority of military law who violated the Articles of War.150 In addition, 
Article 42 states that offenders when found guilty by a general court-martial cannot be sentenced to 
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incarceration in a civilian penitentiary unless the law they broke has an equivalent within the civilian 
statutes.151 Most draftee offenders were convicted of trivial violations under the Articles of War, which 
did not have civilian equivalents meaning that a significant portion of them ended up serving their 
sentences in Leavenworth, or various Disciplinary Barracks branches around the country. 
Even though they had not volunteered, newly inducted draftees who violated the Articles of 
War found themselves with very few rights when compared with civilian criminal proceedings. Court-
martial proceedings were entirely within the purview of the executive branch of government, with no 
opportunity for judicial review of the trials by any civilian appellate court.152 This meant that if a soldier 
was accused of an offence under the Articles of War it was up to the convening authority to determine 
whether or not there was enough evidence to bring it to trial. If there was, the convening authority 
appointed between five and thirteen officers to sit in judgement over the accused and hear the 
evidence. A Judge Advocate was appointed by the court to act as the prosecution, and the defendant 
was given the choice between having a Judge Advocate appointed for the defence, or choosing civilian 
counsel at his own expense. Once a verdict was reached it was sent to the convening authority for 
review along with any sentencing decisions. All sentences were sent to the Office of the Judge Advocate 
General for final review, and then that was the end of it. The accused had no right to appeal the decision 
after the final review. 
The court-martial system was designed for a professional army of volunteers, but with civilian 
inductees came complaints of constitutional rights violations. As military lawyer John Wills argues, 
“Claims of the denial of constitutional due process by courts-martial received little consideration from 
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the federal courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”153 This changed during the war, as 
the combination of the Selective Service Act and the jurisdiction of the Articles of War meant that the 
United States Army increased from a small professional force of 30,000 men in 1916 to over four million 
by the end of the war.154 In the past when vast numbers of civilians have been recruited into the 
military, discipline has suffered. Evidence of this can be found in the increased need for military police 
during these periods to guard the rear against the abuses of these undisciplined citizen soldiers.155 The 
First World War was no exception, as shown by the need to resurrect the military police to enforce 
military law.156 The significant increase in annual trials by general courts-martial during the war also 
demonstrates this. During the fiscal year ending in 1916, 4,743 personnel were tried by a general court-
martial, whereas in the fiscal year ending 1919 that number increased to 16,547.157 To account for this 
massive influx of military offenders, the staff of the Judge Advocate General’s Office was significantly 
increased from just 32 on 6 April 1917 to 373 on 30 June 1919.158 These statistics demonstrate the 
considerable strain that was placed on the military justice system by the recruitment of so many 
civilians. The inevitable result of the increased number of courts-martial was an increased population in 
the Fort Leavenworth Disciplinary Barracks and its branches at Fort Jay and Alcatraz. Before the United 
States joined the war the prison population of Fort Leavenworth was 951.159 By war’s end in 1919 that 
population had increased to 3,703, more than double the maximum capacity of the prison.160 The need 
for a dedicated military police corps, the increase in Judge Advocate staff, the significant increase in 
trials by general courts-martial, and the substantial increase in prisoner population at Fort Leavenworth 
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all demonstrate the strain that was placed on the military justice system by the enlistment of so many 
civilians into the army. 
The increase in trials by court-martial revealed a serious issue with military sentencing. The 
harsh wartime sentences demonstrate the first sign of a divide between the stated goals of military 
corrections and the reality. 161 Sentences could, however, be reduced by the convening authority, but 
according to John Willis, officers sitting on court-martial panels at the time were advised to impose the 
maximum sentences after delivering a guilty verdict, and let the commanding officer reduce it later if 
they chose to do so.162 The backlog of prisoners created by this system was so pronounced that Edmund 
Morgan, a lawyer appointed to the Clemency Committee for the Office of the Judge Advocate General 
after the war, claimed that his committee reduced 18,000 years-worth of prison time from convicted 
soldiers who had unfairly received the maximum possible sentence for trivial infractions.163 It was not 
just the increase in prisoner population that demonstrates the contradiction of the stated purpose of 
the Disciplinary Barracks, but also the excessive nature of sentencing the guilty after a general court-
martial. 
The length and nature of sentencing demonstrates that the goal of military corrections was 
primarily deterrence. Many of the accused were dishonourably discharged in addition to receiving 
exceedingly long sentences of incarceration. Charges of desertion and absence without leave were 
treated with particular harshness, which is likely due to the original purpose of military corrections. A 
few select examples demonstrate both the harshness of sentencing under general courts-martial, and 
how such sentences represent the conflicting goals of military corrections. On 10 April 1918, Nicholas 
Ungar was sentenced to twenty-five years hard labour at Fort Leavenworth after being found guilty of 
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draft evasion and refusal to obey orders.164 Another example is a soldier named Private Charles E. 
Beldridge who was charged with desertion and sentenced to five years hard labour in Fort Leavenworth, 
despite the military record showing he was “mentally defective and imbecile.”165 Another soldier named 
Private Clyde M. Ward was charged with desertion and loss of government property and was sentenced 
to ten years hard labour in Fort Leavenworth, with the record showing he was suffering from pulmonary 
tuberculosis.166 Willard Centlivre was a leper who experienced fatigue and was told by army doctors that 
hard work was the only cure. He deserted and was captured at home. He was found guilty of desertion 
and sentenced to twenty-five years hard labour, being told that hard labour was the only cure for his 
condition.167 It was not just deserters and draft dodgers who were treated harshly, offenders who 
committed what were trivial offences during peacetime found that these were quite serious during 
wartime. No matter how serious the offence, the sentences often contradicted the stated purpose of 
the Disciplinary Barracks. Private Vincent Porr of the 16th Infantry, was sentenced to death for falling 
asleep at his post as a sentinel, although his sentence was later commuted by the President to 
dishonourable discharge and three years hard labour at Fort Leavenworth.168 Someone who has been 
dishonourably discharged, or executed for that matter, cannot be restored to active duty, showing the 
deterrent rather than rehabilitative nature of excessive sentences. There were many such instances of 
drafted civilians who were given excessive sentences for minor infractions under the Articles of War.  
The war also generated another type of military offender; the conscientious objector. These 
men were subjected to the harshest elements of military justice. For example, Charles Mohr was 
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sentenced to fifteen years hard labour at Fort Leavenworth for refusing to wear a military uniform.169 
Another example is six Swedish socialists, Gunnard Johnson, Carl W. Johnson, Axel Carlson, Richard A. 
Carlson, Morris Kamman, and William Tresler, who were sentenced to twenty-five years hard labour at 
Leavenworth for refusing to obey military orders.170 According to the article that reported their 
sentence, the brothers had fled Sweden in order to avoid military service.171 Another objector, Charles 
Clodi, was sentenced to twenty years’ hard labour at Leavenworth for refusing to sign the muster, do 
any work or obey any military orders.172 Howard W. Moore, who went on to record his experience of 
incarceration in his autobiography, was sentenced to five years hard labour at Fort Leavenworth.173 The 
excessiveness of these sentences demonstrates the contradiction between the rhetoric of military 
corrections and the reality. As previously discussed, the primary stated goal of military corrections was 
rehabilitation, or to ‘restore men to the colours.’ Failing restoration, the goal was to prepare offenders 
for a productive civilian career. However, the excessive sentencing and brutal conditions of the prison 
show that deterrence was more likely the unstated goal of military corrections during the war. 
Regardless of the reasons for this change, what is clear is that the unfairness of court-martial sentencing 
brought the military justice system to the public’s attention. 
The sheer number of excessive and unfair sentences brought the issue to the attention of the 
public. When the war was over the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, wrote a letter to the Judge 
Advocate General, Enoch H. Crowder, asking him to address the allegations of certain members of 
Congress as well as several prominent newspapers, that the United States system of military justice was 
flawed. He opened his letter by claiming that “During the times of peace, prior to the war, I do not recall 
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that our system of military law ever became the subject of public attack on the ground of its structural 
defects.”174 As the previous chapter has shown, Baker’s assertion was correct, that public interest in 
military justice was significantly reduced during periods when civilians were not forced to serve in the 
military. The only time Congress became noticeably interested in the United States Disciplinary Barracks 
was when money was involved, or when they needed the facility for civilian purposes. The event known 
as the “Crowder-Ansell dispute” was the primary factor in drawing public attention to the court-martial 
issue. Major General Crowder was the Judge Advocate General for the duration of the First World War, 
but because of various other duties demanding his attention he delegated many of his duties to 
Brigadier General Samuel T. Ansell, who became acting Judge Advocate General.175 Ansell had a slightly 
different interpretation of the statutes than Crowder and believed that the Judge Advocate General not 
only had the authority to review the sentences of all general courts-martial proceedings, but also to 
amend the sentence of a general court-martial if he believed it to be too excessive. General Ansell 
argued that under Section 1199 of the 1878 statutes the Judge Advocate General had the authority to 
alter or even set aside a sentence passed by a court martial, based on the words “review and revise.”176 
Ansell reduced several sentences on this argument until Crowder confronted him and removed from his 
position as acting Judge Advocate General, after which Crowder promised to devote more of his time to 
the role. Ansell made this dispute public, and the result was a public campaign for the reform of the 
court-martial system. Ansell argued that some form of civilian appeals process was necessary in order to 
protect the rights of those being tried and sentenced. However, this public campaign was based on the 
rights of the accused in appealing excessive sentencing rather than the specific conditions within 
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military prisons. The issue with sentencing under general courts-martial during the First World War 
demonstrates the contradiction between the rhetoric of military corrections and the reality. However, it 
does not reveal much about issues with military corrections itself once the sentence has been passed 
down. 
With so many military offenders sentenced to hard labour at Leavenworth, the facility was put 
under a significant strain. This strain both revealed flaws within the system and brought those flaws to 
the attention of the public. An analysis of the institutional histories of the prison written by members of 
the military in contrast with newspaper articles and accounts from conscientious objectors present a 
fairly accurate impression of the realities of the prison. The progress narratives written on the 
Disciplinary Barracks only mention the civilian aspect of the First World War very briefly, spending more 
time focusing on the rehabilitative programs being run at the prison. Jones and Price both state that 
during the First World War “disciplinary problems increased accordingly.”177 However, Jones argues that 
the army was in the best possible position in its history to deal with military offenders due to the 
opening of branches of the United States Disciplinary Barracks on the East Coast and West Coast, as well 
as the condition of the parent facility at Fort Leavenworth.178 Price states that in early 1917 vocational 
activities within the prison experienced a significant growth due to increased financial aid from 
Congress.179 The legacy of Barr’s reforms was the belief that work and hard labour were the best and 
only forms of rehabilitation. As such, the vocational programs are seen by Jones and Price as progressive 
steps towards the institution that exists today. Jones, Price, and Youngs all state that the prisoners were 
expected to “earn their keep”, reaffirming the idea that hard labour was not only the best form of 
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rehabilitation, but also the best way to create an institution that could support itself.180 According to 
Price, the farm colony became more productive than in previous years and the various vocational 
activities reached the point at which they could contribute to the financial upkeep of the prison. For 
example, new machinery was added to the shoe repair shop increasing its capacity to 500 pairs per day, 
and also to allow the production of both military and civilian clothing.181 Price also states that by 1917 
the work of the Department of Psychiatry and Sociology became accepted within the prison, and the 
practices still in use as late as the 1970s were developed during this period.182 The psychiatry program 
will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Jones and Price make it clear that the vocational 
programs were successful based on their expansion and monetary return. The sources imply in talking 
up the success of the vocational programs that the rehabilitative ethic was alive and well at 
Leavenworth. 
In addition to the vocational programs, Jones states that three “progressive firsts” in military 
penology took place at Fort Leavenworth in 1919. He states that the first Clemency Board was 
established to review every single case tried by a general court-martial and that in five months the 
Board had acted upon 3,360 cases, restoring 941 prisoners to duty, and remitting the sentences of a 
further 1,412.183 However, as previously stated in this chapter, the Clemency Board that Jones mentions 
was actually the result of civilian pressures from outside, instigated by Ansell’s public debate with 
Crowder in the newspapers over the rights of the accused in general court-martial proceedings. So, the 
Clemency Board was not a “progressive first” in military penology as Jones suggests, but rather an 
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example of pragmatic alignment as the result of external pressures being forced upon the military 
system. 
Price also claims that as a “progressive first” the prison administration set up the General 
Prisoner’s Conference Committee on 10 June 1919 in order to better facilitate cooperation between the 
administration and the prisoner population for the betterment of conditions. Both Jones and Price make 
the same claim, that the prisoner’s committee was a progressive step taken by the administration. 
However, according to Jones and Price the committee was a failure and was abolished due to the 
“attempted usurpation of the institution.”184 The military sources leave out an important factor that 
initiated the prisoner’s committee in the first place. In February of 1919, the majority of prisoners at 
Fort Leavenworth initiated a general strike to protest the conditions of the prison. The conscientious 
objectors Howard W. Moore and Roderick Seidenberg provide more details of the strike in their 
autobiographies. According to Seidenberg, the February strike was preceded by a riot on Christmas Eve 
1918. Seidenberg writes that the cause of the riot was the fact that the inmates all “…smarted under the 
terrific sentences which were the common fate…full of resentment at the brutalities of the guards and 
the merciless work they were forced to do.”185 Moore says much the same about the causes of the riot: 
But the prison was smoldering with greater complaints, chief of which was the length 
and inequality of the sentences the inmates were serving…Smaller grievances about 
food and working conditions, the tyranny of the guards, censorship and delay of mail, 
etc., were magnified by the overwhelming sense of unfair and arbitrary punishment.186 
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This contradicts the image presented by the military sources of a progressive correctional facility 
working to rehabilitate military offenders who had lost their way. According to Moore and Seidenberg, 
conditions were brutal and not at all conducive to rehabilitation.  
This general attitude of the prisoners continued into the New Year and culminated in the 
general strike of February 1919. The reporter, Winthrop D. Lane, happened to be visiting the prison at 
the time of the February strike and corroborated much of what Moore and Seidenberg state in their 
accounts. According to Lane, over 2,300 of the prisoners at Fort Leavenworth were involved in the non-
violent sit-down strike, led by the approximately 300 conscientious objectors.187 The situation became 
heated and nearly escalated into extreme violence as the commandant of the prison, Colonel Sedgewick 
Rice, was preparing to call the troops in to put down the riot by force. However, Rice himself had agreed 
that the conditions of the prisoners were quite poor and that it was useless to keep minor offenders 
behind bars who were only there because their crimes had been committed during wartime. Because of 
this, Rice agreed to negotiate with the leaders of the riot and the situation was resolved peacefully. Rice 
agreed to bring the soldiers’ case to Washington so that Congress could look into commuting their 
sentences. The commandant also agreed to set up a permanent grievance committee so that inmates 
could have their complaints heard.188  
Moore and Seidenberg briefly mention the event which the military sources called the 
“attempted usurpation of military control” which led to the abolition of the grievance council. Six 
months after the initial strike there was a second strike and this one was put down with violence. 
Seidenberg states that “Six months later the conscientious objectors who still remained were suddenly 
transferred…and six days later a second strike broke out. It was crushed with bullets, and Leavenworth 
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returned once more to the peaceful days of iron discipline.”189 Moore also briefly mentions this second 
strike, stating “The following July, after most of the [conscientious objectors] were gone, a tragic sequel 
took place: a “mutiny” which seemed to have been instigated by the authorities was put down brutally 
with the loss of six lives, and “iron rule” returned to Leavenworth with a vengeance.”190 Except for the 
military sources, Seidenberg and Moore’s brief mention are the only sources on the strike, neither of 
whom were present. Unfortunately, neither Moore nor Seidenberg give their sources for the strike or 
say how they heard about it. Unlike the first strike in February, there are no newspaper articles on the 
second strike. What is clear from this is that the prisoners’ grievance committee was not a progressive 
first instituted by prison authorities, but rather a compromise forced on them by civil disobedience from 
within the prison. The fact that the committee was abolished at the first opportunity further reinforces 
the fact that it was a forced measure, in response to internal pressure. 
The contradiction between the military sources and other sources calls for a more in-depth look 
at prison conditions preceding the strike and how they contradict the rhetoric of rehabilitation. 
Accounts from inside the Disciplinary Barracks are sparse in any era as there are military censors in place 
preventing news from reaching the outside world. According to Plotkin, modern practice at the 
Disciplinary Barracks is that all letters are examined, with any letters with the words ‘political prisoner’ 
being automatically censored.191 In the 1970s one prisoner was sent to solitary confinement for sending 
“contraband” letters to his attorney.192 Also, prisoners are never allowed to speak to the media under 
any circumstances.193 However, during the First World War many of the conscientious objectors 
incarcerated at the Disciplinary Barracks managed to smuggle information about their experiences to 
the outside world. The conscientious objectors set up a secret network within the prison for smuggling 
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information to the outside world. “Kite” was the codename for an underground letter, smuggled from 
prisoner to prisoner and then eventually added to the executive mail pile. Seidenberg once used this 
system to send a sketch of a prisoner in solitary confinement via underground channels to New York. 194 
At other times their letters were entrusted to a friendly guard to deliver outside the walls.195 The 
primary operator of the kite network at Leavenworth was a conscientious objector named Clark Getts, 
who was serving twenty five years hard labour for refusing to perform the duties of a soldier.196 While at 
Leavenworth he worked in the statistics department, which gave him free access to much of the 
prison.197 When the conscientious objectors were forced into the showers, Getts would secretly join 
them as the steam and large number of persons made it difficult for the guards to keep track of how 
many prisoners were in the room. In this environment Getts would obtain the address of a loved one, 
and collect letters to “kite over the wall”, and share rumours of the outside world with his fellow 
objectors.198 
The accounts of conscientious objectors provide a detailed view of conditions within the prison. 
Objectors such as Moore and Seidenberg went on to write of their experiences within the military 
correctional system during the First World War. The Hutterite Hofer brothers also recorded some of 
their experiences in various journal entries and letters home to their parents. The Hofer brothers were 
religious objectors who refused to serve in the military on religious grounds and were eventually 
sentenced to hard labour at Fort Leavenworth. Unfortunately, the brothers died of pneumonia in 1918. 
Their accounts of their treatment at the hands of the guards survive through their journals and letters 
home, which have been compiled by Duane Stoltzfus, in his book Pacifists in Chains.199 Moore recorded 
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his experiences years later in his autobiography, Ploughing my Own Furrow. Moore was an absolutist 
objector who refused non-combatant service based on his pacifist beliefs and then refused to work in 
the prison as required as he believed that even prison labour contributed to the war effort. Seidenberg 
was another absolutist conscientious objector who shared Moore’s beliefs and experiences at 
Leavenworth. Many of the conscientious objectors incarcerated at Leavenworth were absolutists who 
refused to partake in non-combatant work on the grounds that it still supported the war effort. The 
Selective Service Act 1917 provided an alternative for ‘legitimate objectors’ by offering them non-
combatant service as orderlies, stretcher bearers, or some similar role.200 While many ‘legitimate’ 
objectors were offered non-combatant roles to appease their beliefs, the absolutists refused to 
contribute in any way to the war effort. Many of these men were politically minded enough to record 
their experiences and their memoirs provide an image of the harsh realities of the military correctional 
system. Three elements of the prison experience are clear from these sources which demonstrate the 
contradiction of the rehabilitation rhetoric. These are the brutality of the guards, the harshness of 
solitary confinement, and the general atmosphere of the prison itself. 
The fact that the brutality of prison guards often frustrates rehabilitation is not a new 
observation, and the Disciplinary Barracks during the First World War was no exception.201 The brutality 
of prison guards within the United States military is well documented, and demonstrates the 
contradiction between rhetoric and prison practice. Even in the holding areas, certain military police 
officers had a reputation for torture and cruelty in order to coerce confessions out of arrested soldiers. 
One such example is that of Captain Karl W. Detzer of the 308th Military Police Company who was court-
martialled for mistreating American prisoners at a processing station in Le Mans, France, where he 
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tortured those soldiers accused of infractions under the Articles of War in order to get confessions out 
of them.202 Guard brutality also continued within the Disciplinary Barracks itself, as shown by David 
Hofer’s account of how he and his fellow objectors were treated when they first arrived at the 
Disciplinary Barracks in 1918. In the account, Hofer claims that the guards forced the newly arrived 
prisoners to march up a hill from the train to the prison at the point of bayonets, then forced the 
prisoners to stand in the freezing cold for two hours until they were finally ushered to their cells.203 
However, Stoltzfus states that Hofer’s report is contradicted by a report from the commandant of the 
Disciplinary Barracks, Sedgewick Rice, who stated that the prisoners were not made to stand in the cold 
for anywhere near the two hours claimed.204 Furthermore, Colonel Rice stated that guards at 
Leavenworth carried handguns, not rifles, making the bayonet story highly unlikely.205 But the fact that 
guards used bayonets is also repeated by other sources talking about other institutions. Moore states 
that at Camp Funston a group of political objectors were constantly harassed by the guards, being 
forced around the parade ground “at the point of a bayonet.”206 There is also evidence of Disciplinary 
Barracks guards carrying shotguns, as shown by an attempted escape from the Governor’s Island branch 
of the prison in 1929 in which an inmate, Private Keefer, wrestled a shotgun from a guard and tried to 
escape.207 While a shotgun is not a rifle, it is certainly not a pistol, showing a discrepancy in Rice’s claims. 
Regardless of these conflicting reports, Hofer’s account demonstrates the perceived cruelty of the 
military guards at Leavenworth.  
Bayonets aside, the brutal actions of the guards are further corroborated by the testimonies of 
Moore and Seidenberg. In his autobiography, Moore gives an account of how the guards at Leavenworth 
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constantly harassed a group of Molokan Christian pacifists by dragging them across the prison yard by 
their beards, forcing them to stand at attention for hours, and then clubbed them whenever they 
slumped or leaned against the wall.208 Moore also writes that at roll call every day, prisoners were 
forced to stand at attention in a military fashion while an officer counted them. One day during this 
counting, Moore was exhausted from his treatment in solitary confinement and so he slumped down 
and laid on the floor. The officer was so enraged by this that he lost his count and had to start again, 
warning Moore that there would be serious consequences if it happened again. Moore again laid down 
on the floor, refusing to stand at attention so the officer had him severely beaten by two other guards. 
Moore awoke several hours later with his head being cradled in the lap of another guard who muttered, 
“Jesus, if he can stand this, he’ll win.”209 Another example Moore gives is that after spending two weeks 
in solitary confinement he was allowed to have a regular diet again. His first meal was a plate of soupy 
beans, which the guard shoved under the cell gate and then spat into it.210 Seidenberg tells another 
story of one inmate in the psychiatric wing who had a deformed foot who should have been exempted 
from the draft, but was inducted anyway, eventually being charged with insubordination and sent to 
Fort Leavenworth. Seidenberg states that the guards delighted in making fun of him and telling him that 
he would be discharged any day now. 211 Another inmate in the psychiatric ward planned to escape in a 
packing crate. The guards found out about it and allowed him to believe it would succeed. They wheeled 
him to the railroad station and left him there for a few hours, then took the crate into the executive’s 
office and opened it there. 212 These instances demonstrate the brutality and impatience of the guards 
through their actions towards the prisoners. Seidenberg further states that the guards had never 
encountered the level of resistance shown by the conscientious objectors among previous inmates, 
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attributing their brutality to frustration.213 Despite the cause of their frustration, the brutality of the 
guards did not create an environment conducive to rehabilitation. 
The guards also had legitimate punishments at their disposal to inflict on inmates. Once the 
objectors were processed and became official inmates of the prison they were ordered to work with the 
rest of the prisoners. However, the absolutist objectors who found themselves incarcerated at 
Leavenworth were those who had refused non-combatant service on the grounds that it was still 
contributing to the war effort and therefore contrary to their pacifist beliefs. On the same grounds, most 
absolutist objectors refused to work and were punished with the harshest measure at the disposal of 
the guards; solitary confinement. Moore arrived at Leavenworth on Armistice Day and was immediately 
placed in solitary confinement for refusing to work.214 Moore writes that during his time in solitary he 
was chained in the standing position for nine hours a day.215 He was kept on a diet of bread and water, 
and shared his cell with numerous swarms of bedbugs and rats.216 Seidenberg was treated much the 
same as Moore in solitary, including being manacled and given a limited diet. 
The punishments for not working were so harsh because they had worked in the past, when the 
recipients were volunteers. However, they were inflicted upon soldiers who had a very different concept 
of duty and discipline. Conscientious objectors had such strong political and spiritual convictions that 
they were willing to put up with such treatment for as long as was necessary to make their point. The 
severity of the punishment did not factor into their world view; the only thing that mattered to them 
was the act of defiance. This challenged the entire system of military corrections at the time, revealing a 
flaw in the harsh punishments. 
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It was the atmosphere of the prison, as well as the brutal policies themselves, which further 
demonstrates the deterrent nature of military corrections. This was due to a combination of 
overcrowding of the facility and the previous factors already mentioned. The result was a hostile and 
violent atmosphere which was not conducive to rehabilitation. Seidenberg, for example, states that  
At Leavenworth, I soon learned, one helped the war even while resisting it. The Barracks 
constituted a kind of power station sending forth currents of fear, a prison with unseen 
dynamos that created tension and dread throughout the army.217  
Here, Seidenberg is saying that the prison relies on a reputation of fear based on brutality to deter 
members of the military from committing acts which would send them there. Moore also refers to the 
prison as a “… forbidding mass of steel and concrete.”218 Until it was demolished in 2006, the original 
structure of the Disciplinary Barracks was nicknamed “The Castle” due to its foreboding dome centre. 
This shows that the physical structure of the prison itself represented a fearful image in the minds of 
those it is meant to deter, in a manner similar to that of the Eastern State Penitentiary.219 In other 
words, this was a place to be avoided, not a place to better one’s self. 
The internal structures of the prison had the same effect in creating a fearful deterrent. Moore 
states that the prison administrators intentionally created a culture of fear within the prison itself in 
order to coerce inmates into conformity.220 He argues that part of this mechanism was the utilization of 
other more violent offenders to make less violent ones more pliable. One instance of this was when 
Moore was chained in the standing position in his solitary cell, and the door was left open. A soldier 
serving a life sentence for murdering his paymaster in France, identified only as ‘Red’, came into 
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Moore’s cell and put his cigarette out on Moore’s hand. For Moore, this was another part of the whole 
system of military incarceration.221 The observations of Moore and Sedienburg about the nature of the 
prison environment further reinforce the fear element of Leavenworth. It was meant to be a fearful 
place so that soldiers were deterred from committing acts that would send them there. 
When word of the brutal prison practices inflicted on conscientious objectors reached the 
public, eventually some of those practices were abolished. This was largely due to organisations such as 
the People’s Freedom Union, the American Union Against Militarism, Fellowship of Reconciliation, and 
the National Civil Liberties Bureau. All four organisations provided various legal services and advice to 
conscientious objectors and helped spread awareness of their stories to the public. For example, on 
Christmas Day 1919 the People’s Freedom Union planed a march of 2,000 people in protest of “political 
prisoners” being held by the government.222 Police broke up the strike, but the People’s Freedom Union 
planned to march on the Whitehouse and present a plea for amnesty to the President.223 While this 
does not prove how widespread public engagement with the brutalities of the Disciplinary Barracks was, 
it does show that several prominent groups were trying to educate the public about those conditions. 
When combined with the public outcry over the court-martial system this does show a degree of public 
engagement with the conditions of military prisons. Furthermore, this is shown by a speech given by 
Charles H. Dillon before the House Committee for Military Affairs in which he presented several 
examples of the brutalities conscientious objectors faced under the military correctional system.224 
Moore also states that he smuggled out his account of the Hutterites which appeared in Norman 
Thomas’s magazine, The World Tomorrow, bringing more public attention to the situation.225 Both 
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Moore and Seidenberg comment on the effects of the public campaign on behalf of the conscientious 
objectors. After 31 days in solitary Moore was told that Secretary of War Baker had banned the practice 
of manacling non-compliant prisoners to the wall as a punishment.226 Seidenberg further states Baker’s 
decision to ban manacling was due to the pleadings of Fanny Villard, a prominent pacifist and 
suffragette.227 This further demonstrates that military prison reform towards pragmatic alignment 
resulted more from external pressures generated by the interrelation between the civilian and military 
spheres, rather than from isolated internal reform movements. 
The whole system of military justice experienced a significant shock during the First World War. 
The system that had been developed over the previous thirty years was ill-equipped to deal with so 
many civilian offenders. Reform came from external pressure rather than from internal reflection as the 
progress narratives suggest. The practice of manacling was banned and many of the excessive wartime 
sentences were reduced by the Clemency Committee after the war. The massive number of incarcerated 
men brought public attention to the state of military justice as a separate system. This acted as a turning 
point towards greater pragmatic alignment, creating a system that is separate but still incorporates 
many of the ideologies present in civilian society. 
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Chapter Four: Pragmatic Alignment and Permanence 
Until the Second World War, Congress viewed the Disciplinary Barracks system as a short-term 
solution to address a short-term problem, rather than as a permanent military institution. In the 1890s, 
when desertion rates had decreased dramatically from the previous decades, Congress closed the 
facility for civilian needs. In the period immediately after the First World War, limited reforms were 
made to the Articles of War, but Congress once again made cuts to the program in favour of civilian 
programs. The Second World War, however, was different, in the sense that the Disciplinary Barracks 
achieved permanence as an institution and that permanence resulted in more pragmatic alignment with 
civilian practices. After the First World War, many Americans believed that the post war period would be 
status quo antebellum in terms of the isolation of the United States from the rest of the world. The 
military was cut back to peacetime levels, and the civilian and military spheres returned to a state of 
relative isolation. The Second World War, however, was a different story in that the American illusion of 
isolationism was shattered. The defeat of the Axis powers did not signal the end of American 
mobilization in the same way as the defeat of the Central Powers did after the First World War. When 
the war ended, the United States found itself in the midst of the Cold War, leading to a shift in the way 
that military institutions were perceived in American culture. The United States could no longer rely on a 
small peacetime army or temporary institutions to fight wars as they arose. America needed permanent 
military institutions and a professional military force that reflected society’s ideals, rather than being 
isolated from them. This is the historical context that allowed the Disciplinary Barracks to be 
transformed into a permanent military institution.  
The Disciplinary Barracks institution changed significantly as a result of the Second World War, 
moving closer to the goals of its founding. The extant histories of Leavenworth do not analyse the 
significance of this change, they simply focus on the fact that the military correctional policy adopted 
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innovative features to deal with the influx of prisoners. It is far more complex than a simple matter of 
dealing with the increased number of prisoners. This chapter will demonstrate that the unique situation 
of the Second World War and the immediate aftermath of the Cold War resulted in the Disciplinary 
Barracks transforming into a permanent military institution with pragmatically aligned practices and 
policies. Because of the unique historical context, the institution was forced to adapt and was placed 
into a situation in which it was allowed to do so. The key developments of the institution which 
demonstrate this fact are the restoration program, the development of military psychiatry, and the 
expansion of the Army parole program after the war. During the war, military necessity required the 
restoration to duty of as many men as possible, but the unique situation of civil-military relations led to 
more of a pragmatic alignment between military goals and civilian correctional principles. Various 
external factors led to the Disciplinary Barracks achieving permanence as a military institution, leading 
to further alignment with civilian values in a more controlled way, rather than requiring such massive 
shocks to the system as a world war. This chapter will, out of necessity, focus on elements of the 
Disciplinary Barracks institution that deviate from Fort Leavenworth. Primarily, this will be a focus on the 
Rehabilitation Centres that were established during the Second World War. These facilities performed a 
key function in changing how Fort Leavenworth operated, as well as how it was viewed by the public. 
Later, when these Rehabilitation Centres became a permanent fixture of the military justice system 
during the Vietnam War, Fort Leavenworth as a metonym for the harshness of military justice became 
cemented. 
Not long after the First World War, the public once again lost interest in military justice and 
military incarceration, resulting in more financial cuts to the Disciplinary Barracks system. The war was 
over, and reforms to the Articles of War meant that incarcerated soldiers now had an extra appellate 
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process in the form of the Board of Review.228 However, according to Captain David A. Schlueter in 
Military Law Review, 
…a troublesome aspect remained. A single commander could prefer charges, convene 
the court, select the members and counsel, and review the case. The spectre of unlawful 
command influence lingered. But in the quiet, peacetime years which followed the 1920 
revision, this caused little concern. The citizen soldier returned to his work, the regular forces 
were involved in no major discipline problems, and the 1920 Articles of War seemed to function 
smoothly. With only minor amendments, these articles were those used by courts-martial 
during World War II.229  
Without articulating it directly, Schlueter identified the effects of civil-military relations on the military 
justice system in the period following the First World War. Once again, military justice reform followed a 
familiar formula. An external event generates public interest because military justice affects civilians, 
but once that event ends so does public interest in military justice reform. In this particular instance, the 
main issue that the civilian public cared about was the relatively high numbers of men who were 
incarcerated within the military prison system due to the lack of appellate process in the court-martial 
system. But the Board of Review had cleared the backlog by 1920 and granted clemency to many of the 
prisoners. When that process was complete, the military and civilian worlds became divorced once again 
and the pre-war status quo of military isolation was resumed. To that end, in 1929 the Disciplinary 
Barracks at Fort Leavenworth was turned over to civilian authorities to serve as an annex for the civilian 
United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, to deal with the increased number of federal prisoners due 
to the strengthening of federal laws during the 1920s and 30s. For Congress, the needs of the civilian 
justice system superseded the needs of the military. Edward A. Krieger, the Judge Advocate General at 
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the time, is quoted saying that such a transfer would contradict the intent of the law establishing Fort 
Leavenworth as a military prison.230 Despite Krieger’s protestations, the facility was transferred and was 
operated as the United States Penitentiary Annex for 11 years. Then in 1933, Alcatraz Island, which had 
previously been operated as the Pacific branch of the Disciplinary Barracks, was also converted to a 
federal prison for civilians, in a similar manner to Fort Leavenworth.231 The only facility remaining within 
the Disciplinary Barracks system was the Atlantic branch at Fort Jay, New York.232 There are no available 
sources on how Fort Jay was run during this time, but the military sources imply that it followed the 
same policy that had been developed at Fort Leavenworth.  
Huntington explains the public disengagement with military affairs as a return to the dominance 
of business pacifism in the 1920s.233 He states that “The ideas and institutions which had been produced 
during the years of business rejection reflected intense professionalism on the outskirts of society.”234 
As previously discussed, this applies to the Disciplinary Barracks in that most of its policy development 
did not include civilian ideals. “The opposition”, Huntington goes on, “was not a few pacifists and 
radicals. It was America itself. Rejected again, there was nothing for the military to do but to retreat 
back to their pre-war isolation and find interest and satisfaction in the mundane duties of their 
profession.”235 The Disciplinary Barracks as a military institution was no exception to this, and suffered 
from the same neglect it did in the past. Although it remained on life support operating out of Fort Jay, 
its future was precarious as it was yet to achieve permanence. 
The fate of the Disciplinary Barracks changed with the outbreak of the Second World War as 
Congress recognised the need for a robust military justice system. Based on the previous record of 
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increases in military disorder during wartime, the War Department began reviving several institutions of 
military justice. America’s military institutions suffered cuts after the First World War ended, meaning 
that the lessons learned during the War were not carried very far. America, for the most part, believed 
that the status quo antebellum would be restored in terms of isolationism, expecting that the nation 
could withdraw from world affairs again and the military could be cut back to peacetime levels. Among 
the first military institutions to be cut was the military police.236 Despite the protests of Brigadier 
General Harold Bandholtz, the pioneer of the US military police, to convince Congress of the necessity of 
a permanent military police branch due to the difficulties of recreating it from scratch every time there 
is a new war, the military police units were once again disbanded at the conclusion of the conflict.237 As 
predicted by Bandholtz, a military police corps was needed once again when America was drawn into 
the next global conflict. On 26 September 1941, Congress officially established the United States Military 
Police Corps, this time making it a permanent fixture of the American military.238 Again, the necessity of 
having a military police force was brought about by a massive influx of citizen soldiers.239 The 
Disciplinary Barracks system was also included in this revival of military justice institutions on the eve of 
war. Leavenworth remained under civilian control as the USP Annex until 16 November 1940, at which 
point the facility was returned to the War Department at the request of the Secretary of War to, once 
again, serve as a military prison.240 This time, its status as a military institution would be permanent. 
The Second World War presented a unique set of circumstances that the US military had to deal 
with, particularly in regards to manpower requirements. No previous war had ever required the 
manpower levels necessary to effectively fight the Second World War, and as such the military could not 
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afford to lose a single man to trivial charges under the Articles of War. According to the Army Almanac a 
total number of 11,367,989 military personnel served between 1940 and demobilization in 1948.241 This 
is more than double the number of personnel who served in the First World War, making the increase in 
disciplinary problems a serious issue. The issue of a massive influx of citizen soldiers from the previous 
war returned, with this added concern of returning as many of them as possible to the frontlines. The 
progress narratives present a positive view of how the Disciplinary Barracks system coped with these 
stresses of the Second World War, but they do not analyse it in the context of the post-war aftermath. 
Price names three significant innovations that contributed to the relative success of the institution in 
dealing with such a high volume of incarcerated men. Price once again states that with the increasing 
population of the prison that “disciplinary problems increased proportionately.”242 He further states that 
the massive influx of prisoners “just about taxed the system to bursting point.”243 The first development 
that Price names is that many prisoners who were sentenced to short terms of incarceration during the 
war were held at facilities located overseas.244 “It was deemed unfair,” Price states, “to soldiers serving 
honorable [sic] in combat zones to return men sentenced to dishonourable discharge to the safety and 
comparative comfort of the Disciplinary Barracks and Federal penal institutions in the continental United 
States.”245 This is in keeping with criminologist Stanley L. Brodsky’s argument that the difficulty in 
deterring military offenders lies in making incarceration in a military correctional facility a less desirable 
option than frontline service without being so cruel as to affect rehabilitation.246 Price estimates that 
around 23,000 general prisoners were held in overseas facilities throughout the war, of which only 7,000 
were considered non-restorable.247 This policy achieved the dual result of making military incarceration 
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a less desirable option than frontline service, as well as keeping complaints of the military justice system 
away from home. Secondly, Price states that the Army established specific facilities aimed at the 
rehabilitation of military offenders who were given punitive discharges, demonstrating the military’s 
commitment to the concept of rehabilitation. According to statistics gathered by John Morris Gray in his 
‘Evaluation of the Army’s Restoration Program’, between 1940 and 1946, 84,245 men went through the 
Disciplinary Barracks system, of which 42,373 were restored to active duty. 248 Gray references a study 
that was conducted on the men restored which found that 80 percent of restorees were serving 
satisfactorily in their respective units six months after their release. 249 Price credits this successful policy 
of restoration as the third crucial factor in the success of the Disciplinary Barracks system during the 
Second World War. Price writes that “World War II was the severest test of the Disciplinary Barracks 
since its inception in 1875. The system proved more than adequate to accomplish its mission. This 
period also pointed out the need for a formalized program geared toward returning selected prisoners 
to duty.”250 This analysis of the situation is accurate to a point, but Price does not take into account the 
complaints that came after the war, nor does he give enough details of the external context that 
contributed to these civilian-like developments. For Price, the success of these three developments was 
that they kept men out of the Disciplinary Barracks system, which prevented the overcrowding issues of 
the previous war. The developments were much more significant than that, and represented a shift in 
military penology. 
Unlike the previous war, there was little civilian criticism of the military justice system during the 
course of the Second World War. The lack of criticism during the war does not mean that the system 
was working perfectly, as evident from the need for the Uniform Code of Military Justice to replace the 
                                                          
248 Gray, ‘Evaluation of Army’s Restoration Program’, The Military Prison, p.112. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Price, History of the USDB, p. 42. 
78 
 
Articles of War after the war. Huntington’s argument about the state of civil-military relations during the 
war, and Janowitz’s theory of convergence explains why there was little complaint during the war 
period.251 Huntington argues that during the war military leaders adopted civilian ideals and applied 
them to the manner in which they conducted their campaigns. He states that “The military leaders 
blended with the liberal environment; they lost their alien aloof character and emerged as the supreme 
embodiment of the national purpose.”252 He further states that “In the area of policy and strategy, the 
military ran the war just the way the American people and American statesmen wanted it run…The 
power of professional military leaders reached unprecedented heights in World War II. But they scaled 
these summits only by sacrificing their military outlook and accepting the national values.”253 This is in 
line with Janowitz’s theory of convergence in civil-military relations, which holds that the best way to 
maintain civilian control of the military is to civilianize the military.254 Huntington and Janowitz agree 
that this happened during the Second World War, they just differ on whether or not this is the best 
policy moving forward. But this convergent cooperation did not last and issues of military justice 
became more contentious after the war. Huntington states that “The outstanding aspect of civil-military 
relations in the decade after World War II was the heightened and persistent peacetime tension 
between military imperatives and American liberal society.”255 He further states that “Military 
requirements thus became a fundamental ingredient of foreign policy, and military men and institutions 
acquired authority and influence far surpassing that ever previously possessed by military professionals 
on the American scene.”256 Applied to the specific case of military justice and penology, this argument 
explains both why there was a lack of criticism of the system during the war, and why the system was 
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radically altered after the war. Due to the unique circumstances of the Second World War, the 
Disciplinary Barracks system was not only revived, but expanded on in a convergent manner. Many of 
the elements implemented at the Disciplinary Barracks resemble civilian justice elements, such as 
rehabilitation. 
As with the previous war, a key issue that remained within the military justice system, and one 
which Price does not address, was command influence over court-martial proceedings. This contributed 
to Price’s comment that “disciplinary problems increased proportionately,” which is quite the 
understatement, as examining the court-martial system again reveals.257 According to Captain John T. 
Willis, a Judge Advocate and contributor to Military Law Review, as soon as the war ended the public 
began agitating for reform of the military justice system, as they did after the First World War. 258  
Despite the reforms of 1920, there were still a significantly high number of courts-martial, and 
subsequently a high number of men sentenced to terms of incarceration. For the Army alone, during the 
period between 1942 to 1945 there were a total number of 2,053,816 courts-martial convened, 
including general, special, and summary courts-martial.259 From this number, according to statistics 
gathered by Gray, 84,245 men were sentenced to punitive discharges after terms of incarceration. It 
must be noted that while Willis’ statistics count the number of courts-martial that were convened 
during the period, they do not determine how many individual offenders there were as individual 
soldiers could have been tried multiple times throughout their careers. Willis quotes Ernest Gibson, an 
officer who acted as a military judge during the war, who gave an account of what was expected of trial 
judges during the war. 
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We were advised, not once but many times, on the Courts that I sat on, that if we adjudged a 
person guilty we should inflict the maximum sentence and leave it to the Commanding General 
to make any reduction…I was dismissed as a Law Officer and Member of a General Court-Martial 
because our General Court acquitted a colored man on a morals charge when the Commanding 
General wanted him convicted – yet the evidence didn’t warrant it. I was called down and told 
that if I didn’t convict in a greater number of cases I would be marked down in my Efficiency 
Rating; and I squared right off and said that wasn’t my conception of justice and that they had 
better remove me, which was done forthwith.260 
Gibson’s observation demonstrates the clear divide that existed between military and civilian notions of 
justice at the time, reflected in the effects of command influence. Although he was a military officer, 
Gibson’s notion of justice was more in line with civilian ideals in that justice should be an objective 
search for truth. This opposed to the notion of military justice being imposed on Gibson from the top 
down as a mechanism to restore discipline, regardless of whether or not the accused was actually guilty. 
Despite the issues that arose from this practice of passing overly harsh sentences for trivial 
infractions during the First World War, the practice continued into the Second. Another more well-
known example of command influence over the military justice system is the general court-martial of 
Lieutenant Richard Winters of the 101st Airborne Division. In 1944, before the invasion of Normandy, 
Winters was ordered by his company commander, Captain Herbert Sobel, to inspect the company 
latrines at 1000 hours. He carried out his orders at that time, but was later informed by Sobel that he 
had changed the time to 0945, and as such Winters had failed to carry out his orders. Sobel attempted 
to issue a non-judicial punishment to Winters to make an example of him, but Winters submitted a 
letter of appeal to the battalion command post requesting trial by court-martial. Eventually, the court-
                                                          
260 Ernest W. Gibson quoted in Willis, ‘The US Military Court of Appeals’, pp. 41-42. 
81 
 
martial was thrown out by the convening authority, Colonel Robert Sink, due to Sobel’s own 
inadequacies as a combat commander, so Winters was returned to his company with the charges 
dropped.261 Although there were no charges in this instance, it demonstrates how fickle the nature of 
charges under the Articles of War could be due to the power of command influence. The Board of 
Review that had been established after the previous war did have an effect at reducing the number of 
cases that the Office of the Judge Advocate General had to go over, but thousands of men still found 
themselves incarcerated during the war. The example of Gibson demonstrates that courts-martial often 
resulted in a guilty verdict due to command influence, while the qualitative example of Winters’ 
situation shows just the kind of charges that commonly resulted in a court-martial proceeding. Price may 
focus on the positive elements of the Disciplinary Barracks during the war, but the fact remains that not 
much had changed within the court-martial system since the First World War. Men were still being 
convicted for minor charges and sentenced to terms of incarceration at the Disciplinary Barracks. 
The post war criticism of the military justice system resulted in the passage of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice which replaced the Articles of War permanently. The UCMJ addressed many of the 
issues previously raised with the military justice system, making the rights of the accused clearer and 
giving them more protections. This was a major breakthrough for military penology as well as military 
justice in general, as it addressed the key issue that resulted in so many incarcerations of civilians during 
wartime; the military appellate process. Willis states that the American public demanded the reform of 
military justice after hearing stories of injustices.262 Willis argues that, until the passage of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, soldiers were not protected by the Bill of Rights.263 This also resulted in 
expansion of the clemency policy as well as creating the Court of Military Appeals, a civilian run 
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appellate court for the review of sentences passed by courts-martial. This was a significant towards 
pragmatic alignment in the military justice system as it aided in the reducing command influence on 
trials by giving the accused a civilian appellate option, while at the same time making the rights of the 
accused much clearer. The military sources do not analyse this particular element of the military justice 
system, even though it is important in explaining the future success of the institution. The Court of 
Military Appeals was an element that was forced on the military due to external and internal pressures. 
Pragmatic alignment had implications for military penology, particularly in the realms of 
rehabilitation and restoration to duty. The harsh methods of earlier periods were cast aside, and 
replaced by the philosophy of rehabilitation, achieved primarily through military psychiatry. The 
philosophy of rehabilitation had always been present within the institution as an idea, but it was during 
this period that a specific policy was implemented to properly achieve the goal of restoring as many men 
as possible to active duty. As stated by Price, this function was separated from the main USDB facilities 
during the war, and special dedicated rehabilitation centres were utilised to achieve the goals of the 
restoration policy. Once again, Price does not analyse the significance of this policy beyond stating that 
it relieved pressure on the Disciplinary Barracks by reducing the number of inmates. Much of the 
information about these rehabilitation centres comes from the Chief of the Professional Supervision 
Section in the Neuropsychiatry Consultant’s Division in the Office of the Surgeon General, Major Ivan C. 
Berlien. After the war he wrote a scholarly article in defence of the rehabilitation centres. Reaffirming 
that military thinking shifted during this time to bring it more into line with civilian ideology, Berlien 
states in the article that “…evidence is clear that the less imprisonment, the better, the less punishment, 
the better and the more teaching, retraining, and social reintegration, the better.”264 This sounds similar 
to the rhetoric of rehabilitation seen previously with figures such as Thomas F. Barr, but this time the 
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policy came to fruition as the restoration statistics show. The unique circumstances of the Second World 
War meant that the rehabilitation centres were able to achieve the goal of restoration to duty on a scale 
not seen previously within the institution.  
A key development that demonstrates the pragmatic alignment of these rehabilitation centres 
was the utilization of psychiatry within the military justice system. According to Major James J. Gibbs in 
Military Law Review, psychiatric evaluation had been a factor in the military justice system since the 
M’Naughten rules for criminal culpability were adopted by the military justice system in the nineteenth 
century. 265 “In actual practice,” Gibbs states, “the military psychiatrist appears infrequently as an expert 
witness in a court-martial, and when he does appear he is usually called by the prosecution.”266 Gibbs 
goes on to say that “As a rule when the defendant as the result of pretrial psychiatric examination is 
found to have a mental disease, defect or derangement that renders him unable to distinguish right 
from wrong, adhere to the right, or to cooperate in his own defense, he is not brought to trial, and he is 
released to the medical authorities for treatment and ultimate disposition.”267 So, psychiatry had always 
existed within the military justice system, but it was not until the Second World War that it was utilized 
to a significant extent in the rehabilitation and restoration of the offender. Gibbs also states that civilian 
criticisms of the military system is based on their dissatisfaction of the M’Naughten rules in favour of the 
Durham Decision.268 On the subject of sociopathic psychiatric issues that civilian psychiatrists consider a 
mental disease rather than an indication of wrong doing, Gibbs voices his disagreement of this by stating 
that “In this area psychiatrists are not experts, and the problem must be dealt with by judicial 
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authorities and penologists.”269 Disagreement over the military’s use of psychiatry during the court-
martial phase remains contentious. 
This expansion of psychiatry within the military during the Second World War also extended to 
military penology. According to Berlien, “The role of the psychiatrist in military prisons has been 
recognized and enlarged since World War I.” 270 He goes on to say that “In October 1942, nine cadres of 
five officers each, detailed by the service commands, were ordered to the US Disciplinary Barracks, at 
Fort Leavenworth, for an intensive course in orientation in the operation of that institution. These 
cadres later returned to their respective service commands and set up Service Command Detention and 
Rehabilitation Centers.”271 Following this, in November 1943 the Army Service Forces encouraged the 
Rehabilitation Centers to use psychiatric methods to screen out those prisoners that could not be 
restored to duty so that they could be transferred to a Disciplinary Barracks or other Federal 
correctional facility to serve out their sentences.272 As the Second World War restoration policy 
developed, military psychiatry became more imbedded in the military prison system, as well as the 
court-martial system itself. In 1941, the Department of Psychiatry and Sociology was set up at the 
Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, representing a penological shift from the harsh physical 
methods that were used during the First World War.273 According to Berlien, many commands during 
the Second World War had it as standard operating procedure to have the accused examined by an 
army psychiatrist to determine if they were of sound mind. Many who were found to be mentally ill 
were sent to hospital rather than prison. He states in the official psychiatric textbook for the military 
that “If convicted, the prisoner soon met a psychiatrist at the rehabilitation center, disciplinary barracks, 
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or Federal Penitentiary to which he was sent. The primary function of these institutions has always been 
the restoration of prisoners to duty as soldiers.”274 Here, Berlien may just be echoing the original 
rhetoric about the original purpose of the Disciplinary Barracks system, but he is also revealing the 
change in function. There were no psychiatric evaluations of the conscientious objectors during the First 
World War. 
It is important to go beyond Price’s brief mention of the introduction of psychiatry and sociology 
at Leavenworth in order to more comprehensively analyse its significance to pragmatic alignment in the 
field of military penology. Military psychiatry began in earnest after the First World War, when a 
predominant military belief was that military offending, along with other mental conditions such as 
post-traumatic stress disorder, or shell shock as it was known at the time, was the result of a weak 
constitution of the individual which could be eliminated from the service through improved screening of 
potential recruits. 275 Colonel Albert J. Glass argues that World War I psychiatry eliminated overt 
psychotic disorders, but not covert or neurotic ones.276 This belief that psychiatric problems could be 
eliminated at induction continued after the First World War and up to the Second World War.277 
Furthermore, Glass states that before the war, army psychiatry was not as well developed. Personnel 
who were diagnosed as “insane” were either immediately discharged, or transferred to the Government 
Hospital for the Insane.278 During the Second World War military psychiatry became more engrained 
within the military justice system in a manner that was reflective of civil-military relations at the time. 
Public approval of these programs in the manner consistent with Huntington’s argument about 
civil-military relations is evident from the way that the media praised the military prison system, 
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particularly the rehabilitation programs. On 5 May 1943 the New York Times ran a piece praising the 
new rehabilitation program entitled ‘Army Reclaims its “Black Sheep.”’ The article focused on one of the 
new rehabilitation centres at Camp Pickett, Virginia, claiming that the methods used at the facility used 
the modern principles of psychiatry in order to rehabilitate offenders and restore them to active service. 
The article states that “In carrying out the plan, the Army has not been afraid to use modern methods of 
psychology, psychiatry and sociology.” The article reveals the underlying purpose as well in the 
numerous quotes from military officials claiming that manpower is too precious to waste through overly 
punitive articles of military justice. The commander of the post, Colonel John D. Markey, is quoted as 
saying “The bad boy on the post sometimes makes the fightingest [sic] soldier at the battlefront.” 279 This 
is a shift from the First World War mentality of the military that discipline is the most important aspect 
of military justice, now it is a pragmatic ideology based on getting as many men back to the front as 
possible.  
The complaints of injustice that followed the Second World War demonstrates that the lack of 
critique was a temporary result of the unique situation of the Second World War in regards to civil-
military relations. The lack of critique does not demonstrate that the system was working perfectly, but 
rather is reflective of the public’s support of the military during the war, for reasons discussed by 
Huntington. The Uniform Code of Military Justice was created in response to many of the issues arising 
from the Second World War. Comparing the statistics of restoration from the Second World War to the 
Korean War shows that the policy was just starting to stabilise and work in conjunction with some of the 
other innovations to the system at the time, such as parole and clemency. Gray confirms this by saying 
that the Army was not ready for the rehabilitation, restoration, and clemency mission at the start of the 
Second World War, but rather, the system was adapted during this era out of necessity. The modern 
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system emerged as one intended to be dynamic so that it could be applicable in both war and peace.280 
The Korean War did not have the same manpower requirements as the Second World War, which 
differentiated the two periods. As such, military necessity did not require the military’s restoration 
policy to be as lenient as it was in the Second World War. What this demonstrates is the levelling out of 
the military justice system to the current level it sits at; pragmatic alignment of civil and military 
ideologies. For example, during the period between 1 July 1950 and 30 June 1956 there were 43,000 
punitive discharges passed down by courts-martial, of which 1,800 were restored and 5,800 were 
paroled. 281 Despite the proportionately lower number of personnel serving, the percentage of restored 
prisoners was far lower during the Korean War than it was during the Second World War. Nearly fifty 
percent of punitive discharges were restored to duty during the Second World War, while only about 
four percent were restored during the Korean War. According to Herman L. Goldberg and Frederick A.C. 
Hoefer, officers who were involved with the army parole and clemency program in the 1940s and 50s, 
this was in part due to the expansion of the parole system in 1946 and its combination with the post-
war clemency program.282 The expansion of the parole system is another example of post-war reform 
due to the criticism that had not surfaced until after the war. 
The Army’s parole system was expanded after the Second World War, and was brought more 
into line with its civilian counterpart. Goldberg and Hoefer argue that in administering its parole system, 
“the Army has followed accepted standards of modern penology as developed in good civilian parole 
practice and modified by the particular needs of the Army administration.”283 Again, the integration of 
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civilian principles in this area represents pragmatic alignment of civilian practices within military 
corrections. They go on to explain how this convergent system works: 
Each Clemency and Parole Board consists of a civilian penologist as chairman and two Army 
officers, one representing the Judge Advocate General’s Department and one an experienced 
combat officer…Its decision is subject to review by an Advisory Board on Parole which is 
similarly composed of a civilian chairman and two Army officers, one designated by the 
Secretary of the Army and one by The Adjutant General…In accordance with good civilian parole 
practice, the Clemency and Parole Boards have consistently held that a prisoner must satisfy 
certain standards other than the mere technical requirements of eligibility, in order to be 
released on parole.284 
This is another example of pragmatic alignment, shifting the goals of military corrections from purely 
punitive discipline, to adopt the rehabilitative ethos lauded by many civilian penologists. Unlike the 
planned but failed cooperative review board of the prison in the 1870s, this cooperative parole and 
clemency board actually came to fruition due to the unique shift in civil-military relations during the 
Second World War.  
During the Second World War, the priority was to get as many men as possible back to active 
duty. But after the war, ideas surrounding military psychiatry were expanded and philosophy of military 
parole was developed further. Parole focuses on reintegrating the military offender back into civilian 
society after a punitive discharge sentence, rather than the restoration goal of getting them back into 
service. For Goldberg and Hoefer, the military justice system was in a unique situation to prepare men 
for their return to civilian life. They argue: 
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By the very nature of their offences, most military offenders are probably better prospects for 
parole than the average inmate of a state or Federal prison; this applies especially to AWOL and 
desertion cases that constitute a large part of the inmate population in the USDB’s. In this group 
there are many young men whose civilian history prior to entry into the service was more or less 
average and uneventful; they may never have been arrested by the police nor suspected of 
serious delinquency. These men were able to satisfy the requirements of society as long as they 
were civilians. When they entered the Army, they sooner or later encountered situations of 
stress to which they were unable to adjust, finally resulting in AWOL. Desertion, or other 
offences of a military nature. In some cases, the initial transition from civilian to military 
environment was unsuccessful.285 
Goldberg and Hoefer further develop this idea by arguing that “The Army parole procedure may be 
viewed as one phase of larger and more widespread services for the returning serviceman, aiming at his 
social reintegration into his home community. The Army is but one of many public and private agencies 
that are cooperating in this effort. In contributing its share to this program of reintegration, the Army is 
performing a vitally needed service to the community.”286 Here is a direct example of pragmatic 
alignment. Previously, the military’s approach to the wayward soldier had primarily been to attempt to 
restore discipline, and to punish if that effort failed. The idea that the military prison could prepare a 
wayward soldier for life as a civilian if they were not at all suited for military life was a new concept that 
had developed in conjunction with military psychiatry. Before the First World War, the prevailing view 
within the military was that inability to perform as a soldier was the result of mental weakness or 
cowardice. After the war, with the discovery of issues such as shell-shock, the idea that some people 
were more predisposed to falling victim to the stress of battle and the rigors of military discipline led to 
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more intensive screening methods. This also opened the way for more lenient punishments within the 
military prison system. As shown previously, absolutist conscientious objectors during the First World 
War suffered the harshest punishments within the military prison system due to this belief. But with a 
change in attitude, these methods no longer made any sense. Some men are not cut out to be soldiers, 
but that does not mean that they cannot be productive members of society. The adoption of the 
reformed parole system and the expansion of clemency represents this shift. The purpose of Army 
parole, as stated by Goldberg and Hoefer, is to ensure that those prisoners who are deemed non-
restorable are reintegrated back into civilian life safely and efficiently.  
The Second World War was an important turning point in the process of the United States 
Disciplinary Barracks becoming both a permanent and pragmatically aligned military institution. Like the 
First World War before it, the Second World War required millions of men at arms, meaning that 
millions of civilians were inducted into the ranks of the military. Because the reforms based on the 
previous war were limited due to the lack of public interest after the war, many of the same problems 
came up again, mainly, a civilian lack of familiarity with the military justice system, and a backlog of 
prisoners due to a lack of appeals processes. However, the Second World War presented a unique 
problem for the military in that it required a higher level of manpower than any war previously. This led 
the military justice system to institute a lenient restoration program based on a 1915 law which restored 
more than fifty percent of discharged soldiers to duty. This system was in response to the unique 
circumstances of the war and was not sustainable. Primarily, a lack of civilian criticism during the war 
allowed the prison system to function unhindered. But after the war, criticism increased and unlike the 
previous war, it did not fade before pushing through real and meaningful reform of the military justice 
system. The passage of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the changes to the military penal 
system pushed the military justice system more towards pragmatic alignment, granting the military 
courts a wider array of tools for dealing with an offender that did not always call for harsh, draconian 
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discipline. This hybrid system also allowed the process of pragmatic alignment to stabilise, so it no 







The Disciplinary Barracks system did not evolve in an isolated vacuum of military thought. 
Throughout its history, Leavenworth experienced pressures from its intersection with the civilian 
sphere, which led to the pragmatic adoption of practices more in line with the liberal values of wider 
American society. This was not an inevitable progression, and it is unclear whether more convergence, 
as Janowitz calls it, is even a desirable way to make military institutions fit for purpose. It is certainly an 
effective method of civilian control of the military, but if it is at the cost of military functionality and 
combat readiness then it is not worth it. By presenting the history of Leavenworth and the Disciplinary 
Barracks system as a linear progression towards convergence without analysis, the progress narratives 
of Henry Shindler and Major Jerry Price neglect the significance of the broader historical context. The 
teleological approach is not suitable for the study of military institutions such as Leavenworth as it does 
not take into account the wider historical forces that have contributed to its evolution. What has 
resulted from this historical process of change is a military institution that is both functional, and enjoys 
a level of acceptance from the civilian world that allows it to continue its existence. Huntington’s 
functional and societal imperatives have merged at Leavenworth as the institution is functional because 
it has pragmatically adopted civilian principles of penology.  
This thesis has demonstrated that Leavenworth and the wider Disciplinary Barracks system were 
developed as a result of historical changes, brought about by internal and external civilian pressure 
caused by the intersection of the two spheres, particularly defined by three major events. The first was 
the push for reform by Major Thomas Francis Barr. He was a military officer, but brought his experience 
as a civilian lawyer with him in his push for reform. His ideas created the nucleus of the institution, but 
various other external and internal factors resulted in his vision not being realised at the time. Mainly, 
these were cuts to funding and the fact that his reforms were implemented by professional military 
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officers who, at the time, had a purely military ideology that was isolated from mainstream civilian 
society. The second major point of change was the First World War. Millions of civilians were pushed 
into military service, and thousands of citizen soldiers flooded Leavenworth and the Disciplinary 
Barracks system. This massive external pressure to the system brought it back into the public 
consciousness, and forced more civilian reforms on the institution. The third significant event was the 
Second World War, where once again millions of civilians once again were pushed into military service. 
The difference between this and the First World War was the massive manpower requirements and the 
need to return as many men as possible to active service. This led to a broad restoration program within 
the Disciplinary Barracks system. Furthermore, the civil-military environment at the time was one of 
convergence, allowing many civilian theories and practices to filter into the Disciplinary Barracks system. 
Then after the war, partly because America found itself in the midst of the Cold War, the institution 
became a permanent one in the US military.  
The Disciplinary Barracks institution that exists today is similar in many respects to the system 
that was established permanently in the 1950s. The main notable difference is that the rehabilitation 
centres of the Second World War were re-established during the Vietnam war, and as such all 
restoration programs were moved away from Leavenworth. Leavenworth itself is now the only 
maximum-security prison operated by the military, for those soldiers who are serving the harshest 
sentences under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The code itself has gone through numerous 
reforms since Vietnam, but nothing as drastic as its establishment during the 1950s. Due to the historical 
changes analysed in this thesis, the Disciplinary Barracks has become a permanent institution in the 
United States. It remains a separate military prison which has adopted certain civilian principles in order 
to maximise its functionality.  
The permanent status of Leavenworth does not mean that it is finished evolving as an 
institution, or that any further evolution will be a positive change. The benefit of abandoning the 
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teleological narrative of Leavenworth is that each event can be considered in its proper context, and an 
informed decision can be made about whether or not to make changes to the institution to make it 
function more effectively. Whether that means adopting more civilian methods because they work, or 
abandoning any extant programs because they do not, the decision should be made on a case by case 
basis and consider the context. Certain contemporary events have once again cast the public eye on 
issues of military justice, and may result in more reforms. For example, all combat roles were opened to 
women in 2015, bringing a new segment of the civilian population into the military.287 New issues are 
being revealed by this in a manner similar to past events when civilians enter the military. Primarily, the 
manner in which the Uniform Code of Military Justice handles sexual assault cases is drawing fire from 
civilian critiques.288 The next driver of change in military justice could bring the handling of sexual assault 
cases more in line with the civilian justice system. Furthermore, the War on Terror has brought military 
justice and incarceration back into the public spotlight. With the ambiguities of unconventional warfare 
and the rules of engagement, many soldiers are finding themselves on the wrong end of a court-martial.  
Historical events have led Leavenworth to adapt to both the functional imperative, and the 
societal imperative of convergence. The events which forced change on the institution also forced it to 
adapt. Now that it is a permanent institution it can continue to improve its policies in order to become 
more functional. Whether that means adopting more civilian practices would depend on the situation. 
As this thesis has shown, the evolution of Leavenworth has been driven by historical events; not some 
greater teleological purpose. Therefore, it is uncertain what the future will bring for Leavenworth. 
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